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The democratizing effect of technology and internet accessibility has led to the growth of innovation 
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blocking Africa as an investment option. 4. Is a specialized fund. By adhering to these four “rules” a 
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1.1 Background and Objectives 
 
”...the entrepreneur is the modern-day cowboy, roaming new industrial frontiers much the 
same way that earlier Americans explored the West. At his side stands the venture capitalist, 
a trail-wise sidekick ready to help the hero through all the tight spots – in exchange, of 
course, for a piece of the action”.1 To extend the metaphor: Africa is a relatively unexplored 
investment frontier with benefits to reap for those willing to take it on. 
 
To take on the continent requires handling risk and uncertainty unique to Africa. Historically 
the legacy left by colonialism, political uncertainty, corruption, inequality, adverse weather, 
disease, population displacement and conflicts have weighed down the economic develop-
ment of the continent.2 That is the side of Africa that has gained most of the attention and 
created preconceptions impeding the interest in the region.3 There are also many positive 
trends that might come as a surprise to the general reader. Half of the twenty fastest growing 
GDPs in the world in 2019 are African.4 The democratization of technology enabling dis-
ruption and innovation by an ever-widening class of people is changing the landscape of 
opportunities. The continent has the fastest growth globally in internet and smartphone adop-
tion5 and Sub-Saharan Africa6 accounts for 66% of global mobile money transaction vol-
ume7.8  
 
Higher risks equal higher returns, this applies for VC too. This places African VC in a unique 
position if the risk premium of the market is not aligned with reality. It would offer higher 
 
1 Zider 1998 
2 Ake 1996 
3 Hagos 2000 
4 World Bank 2019 ”GDP Growth (annual %)” 
5 Bright 2020 (TechCrunch) 
6 Countries south of the Sahara desert on the continent. There are 54 countries that fit this description. 
7 The value of mobile payment transactions in Sub-Saharan Africa: €415bn, Active mobile payment accounts 
in Sub-Saharan Africa: 159mil, Mobile payment transaction volume in Sub-Saharan Africa: 27,4bn. This 
means that Africa seems to be skipping cards and moving from cash straight to phones in the payment evolu-
tion. 




returns for those willing to venture into Africa and be able to mitigate risks through experi-
ence and knowledge.9 Many VC firms have recognized this potential; foreign VC accounts 
for over 80% of the deals made.10 China and the US lead the pack at almost half of the capital 
invested in start-ups on the continent.11 With Chinese VC investment expected to grow ag-
gressively in the coming years.12 Additionally, Japanese VC firms have started moving in 
on the continent as their domestic market has become oversaturated with capital.13 This re-
cent interest in African VC has made it one of the fastest-growing start-up and VC spaces 
globally. The amount of investment in the region grew tenfold from 2015 to 2019 but is still 
far from its full potential at six times smaller than India and a fourth of Latin America.14  
 
If the African market is attracting a lot of foreign capital and seems to be the next VC gold 
rush, why is none of the capital Finnish? Finland has a strong a start-up culture and knowl-
edgeable VC firms looking to impact and disrupt. Even from a more practical stand-point 
Finland is in the same time zone, there is no language barrier since most countries have 
English as a primary or secondary language and because of the strength of the Euro and the 
relative difference in costs of running a business Finland is in a prime position to invest.  
 
The thesis will examine what is stopping Finnish VC firms from joining the party. More 
concretely the objective of the thesis is to establish the main blockers for Finnish VC firms 
when weighing the option of investing in Africa and then provide solutions to overcome 
them. Additionally, to support the venturing to Africa the thesis will take a form of a roadmap 
explaining the basics and peculiarities of a market where the current successes only begin to 
scratch the surface of its potential.15  
 
1.2 Methodology and Scope 
 
As the thesis is attempting to open the gate for Finnish VC firms to venture to Africa it has 
to be approached not just as an academic paper with legal analysis but also as a business case 
 
9 See Sahlman 2012 
10 Digest Africa 2020 
11 ibid 
12 Adeoye 2020 (VC4A) 
13 Dall 2020 (Ozy) 
14 EMPEA 2020 ”Trends In Global VC+Tech EMPEA’s Inaugural Report On Venture-Backed Startups 
Across EM” The reason the comparison is made is the similar size  




to be useful. The marriage of these three styles is so innate that without pointing out the 
approach taken it might go unnoticed.  
 
The title of the thesis deceives to some extent; to look at Africa as a whole would not align 
with the goal of the thesis for a few reasons. Firstly, Africa is not a homogenous continent. 
Each country has its strengths and challenges from the point of VC investing.16 Secondly, 
when looking at Africa as a whole the amount of information to cover would be so vast that 
by keeping to the maximum thesis length only a scratch of the surface would be possible. 
This would not give real business applicability. Thirdly, by choosing the countries to focus 
the thesis on it steers the reader to concrete markets and takes the first step in venturing to 
Africa for the VC firm; selecting the most potential start-up markets.  
 
The fact that three countries were chosen lead to a lengthy thesis but it was the only way to 
reach the goals of the thesis. The countries chosen for the thesis deep dive are South Africa, 
Nigeria and Kenya. The choice of these countries is based on three facts: they have the most 
activity, they are all different from a VC point of view and they all have English as one of 
the primary languages. South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria combined account for 53% of the 
continents VC activity17 from 2014 to 2019.18 They are all seen as the main hubs of innova-
tion and disruption on the continent with strong internal markets but all different in market 
composition and its supportive infrastructure, as the thesis will highlight.19 Finally, the fact 
that all the countries have English as one of the primary languages was vital from the point 
of having a good base of local sources that were easy to extract knowledge from.20 
 
To analyse these countries a multitude of methods are applied. The thesis covers four legal 
systems with their respective peculiarities.21 To grasp the challenges that venturing to these 
new legal plains entail a comparative analysis of the different environments is performed.22 
The base is the Finnish legal framework for VC investing which belongs to the civil legal 
family. All the African target countries have mixed legal systems which adds another level 
 
16 Groh and Wallmeroth 2016 
17 This is an especially high number when taking into account the fact that 21% of the continent’s VC activity 
is headquartered outside of Africa so these three countries represent 67% of VC activity. 
18 AVCA 2020 ”Venture Capital in Africa: Mapping Africa’s start-up investment landscape” 
19 See De Beer et al. 2016 
20 Negash 2011 
21 See Sarbah et al. 1987 




of complexity to the analysis. The different African legal systems analysed for suitability of 
VC activity (lex lata) were delved into with the view on the nature of law being a social fact. 
The legal landscapes of the selected African countries have a fair amount of customary law 
and informal practices that would not be apparent when examining it as a purely procedural 
phenomenon.23  
 
VC funds do not make investment decisions solely based on the legal environment, so the 
potential target markets are examined from a business point of view too24 using statistics on 
the market and research into the qualitative elements affecting the market.25 Again as a base-
line, the Finnish start-up market is examined to create comparable statistics and market char-
acteristics. The reader gets, like with the legal landscape, an idea of what the current opera-
tional environment is like and what kind of environment the firms would be heading into.  
 
In addition to the legal and business environment analysis, qualitative interviews are em-
ployed to identify the obstacles and give solutions to them. The interviews are thematically 
analysed.26 The first round of interviews is conducted with Finnish VC firms to figure out 
what obstacles they see in investing in African start-ups. The methodology of those inter-
views is delved into in Chapter 5.1. As for the solutions to the obstacles, they are gathered 
by interviewing people working in the African start-up space. The methodology applied for 
the solution creating interviews is covered in more depth in Chapter 6.1. The information 
gathered from the interviews gave great insight into the market far beyond what was possible 
even with a thorough probe into the available research output.  
 
1.3 Approach with Sources 
 
The start-up space is so dynamic and rapidly evolving that information becomes quickly 
obsolete.27 Examining this dynamic environment in a region that generates below 1% of the 
 
23 Van Hoecke 2011 
24 The division in the thesis of legal and market analysis in the build-up to the obstacles and solutions is 
equal. The writer of the thesis did not plan this but it happened naturally as a result of trying to create an all-
encompassing view of the African markets.  
25 See Adongo 2012 
26 Alhojailan 2012 




world’s research and the local start-up space is still in a nascent stage28 was something that 
the writer of the thesis knew would be a major challenge from a source standpoint.29  
 
The fallout of not having an abundance of literary sources was the inordinate use of website 
sources for a thesis. Website sources were used once it was determined that no applicable 
literary work could fill the gap of needed knowledge. To minimize the chances of false in-
formation the websites used were vetted by mirroring other information confirmed through 
other sources against the output of the website. When possible, websites of organizations or 
household news agencies were prioritised. As an example of why in some cases website 
sources had to be prioritised; a lot of the literature on Nigeria was from the 80s when the 
initial oil boom started and though it covered investing as a foreign entity in the country the 
applicability of those finding to the current state of the country is debatable.30  
 
The relatively nascent stage of the start-up space in all three countries manifested itself in 
the lack of cases available for dissection. Scouring the case libraries of each respective coun-
try VC firms have been involved in very few cases, often relating to areas outside the scope 
of this thesis like wrongful dismissal. Besides the nascent stage of the start-up space, two 
other reasons contribute to this. Start-ups are modest in capital reserves so even victorious 
litigation might not bring any returns and often the structures of start-ups that are invested 
in by VC firms are complicated cross-border matters so suit might be brought in a number 
of jurisdictions outside the three selected countries, so the legal analysis was mostly based 
on the codified legislation of the countries and literature around its effectiveness. 
 
In addition to recency, consistency of information was given great consideration. This was 
especially important with financials since different sources had disparities in market size of 
tens of percentages31. The numbers quoted are carefully selected to be realistic and consistent 
across the thesis. Sources used for numerical data or target market info were always as recent 
as possible but with sources relating to the standards of the VC e.g. attitudes towards risk, 
the reputability took precedence within reason.  
 
 
28 Onukwue 2020 (TechCabal) 
29 Duermeijer et al. 2018 
30 See Pinto 1987 




The interviews32 with Finnish VC firms and current investors in Africa were a way to really 
get up-to-date and concrete information on a subject that has very limited research up to this 
point and was the biggest value add to the prevailing of the thesis. The interviews also shaped 
other areas of the thesis than the obstacles and solutions as the free discussions in some cases 
stretched out and pointed to new avenues of information in the VC space.   
1.4 Outline 
 
The thesis is divided into three main parts. Chapters 2 and 3 are introductory to the subject 
matter and create a knowledge base of VC in Finland and Africa. Chapter 4 dives into the 
three selected countries analysing the jurisdictions suitability for start-ups and VC invest-
ment. Chapters 5 and 6 building on interviews and research examine the obstacles and solu-
tions for Finnish VC firms to invest in Africa. In pages, the division is right down the middle 
with an even balance between theory and the analysis.  
 
Chapter 2 explains the history, current state and framework for VC investments globally and 
in Finland. The legal framework and investment process in Finland is covered in great detail 
to enable comparisons with the investment process and laws governing it in the chosen target 
countries so the differences that Finnish VC firms would need to adapt to are clear. Chapter 
3 takes a more statistical approach and examines the VC space of the entire continent focus-
ing on the trend of foreign VC firms entering the market building up the base argument of 
the thesis that there are reasons to venture to Africa. Chapter 3.3 lays out the investment 
process for Finnish VC firms in Africa highlighting the additional steps it might entail. 
 
Chapter 4 analyses the start-up environments of the chosen African countries comparatively. 
It takes an in-depth look at the legal environment to concretize certain legal aspects of ven-
turing into the market33 e.g. taxation and paints a picture of the country and its start-up eco-
system. Chapter 5 covers the four most prevalent obstacles expressed by the Finnish VC 
firms and the methodology used to gather and process the data. Chapter 6 analyses the ob-
stacles one by one and attempts to list potential solutions for them. Chapter 7 ties it all to-
gether and highlights what lessons a VC firm considering venturing to Africa can take away 
from the thesis. 
  
 
32 For a full list of people interviewed see Appendix C. 









Venture capital is the funding of promising companies in the early stages of their lifecycle 
in hopes of a high return. The following oversimplified math explains the basis for the out-
look: 97% of VC profits come from 0.1% of the companies invested in. This means that 
0.1% of the companies have to cover the losses incurred from the 99.9% and make a risk-
reflecting return34 on top of that.35 Facebook is an extreme example in demonstrating how 
one investment can cover losses and then some. In 2005 Accel36 invested $12.7mil in Face-
book when the company was valued at $100mil. Seven years later they were able to cash out 
at $9bn37 representing a 70,766% ROI.38 Facebook is currently one of the eight largest com-
panies globally by market cap in May of 2020. Seven39 out of the eight have been backed by 
VC at some point in their journey.40  
 
The financial realities of the VC industry mentioned above create certain parameters that a 
target company of a VC firm needs to fulfil. The start-up should be innovative, even to the 
level of disruption creating new industries like AirBnB, and with potential for rapid interna-
tional growth through a scalable business model.41 The stages a start-up goes through during 
its journey of growth differ based on the source but a common thread is a division into five 
stages. The division most commonly used is: seed, angel investment, early stage, later stage 
and finally the exit.42 Seed investments are often funded by the so-called three Fs: friends, 
family and fools. A seed stage company is often pre-revenue and might be operating out of 
someone’s bedroom as a side project.43 At the angel investment stage business angels44 in-
vest in the company which is still early on its path but has most likely already moved out of 
 
34 VC firms take on a lot of risk so funds are expected to triple in value within their 5 to year 10 cycle 
35 Lecture at Amazon offices in Stockholm on the 22nd of June 2020 by Jyri Engerstöm from Yes.VC 
36 Palo Alto, California based VC firm 
37 As of writing (15.1.2021) the same investment would be worth about $89bn (excluding post IPO dilution) 
38 Tam and Raice 2012 (WSJ) 
39 Alphabet, Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, Tencent, Alibaba 
40 Lerner and Nanada 2020 
41 FVCA “Find the right investor” 
42 Löning 2017  
43 Pajarinen et al. 2016 
44 Private individuals making investments of over €10k into growth companies they have no familial ties 




the bedroom.45 At this stage, VC investments can be attracted for the first time when the 
start-up has established its output to a level that the VC firm is not just investing in an idea. 
 
In the early stage, a company most likely already has a turnover and might even be profitable 
with hopes that additional capital and advice can take it international or just scale it to the 
next level. The early and later stage hold within themselves funding rounds which are di-
vided into series: Series A and B are classified as early stage and series C and onwards46 are 
later stage. Early stage investments globally average between $1 and $30mil and later stage 
are upwards of $10mil.47 When a VC firm invests in a company in the early stage it often 
takes a non-controlling equity stake to share the business risk and profit from the potential 
exit. The minimum timeframe of an average VC investment is 3 to 7 years.48 After this period 
of nurturing, and if the start-up is still alive, the VC can start looking for an exit option 
through an equity deal or an IPO49.50  
 
Besides finances, the VC firm invests its knowledge and connections. This is referred to as 
active ownership, though not always practised. Especially larger VC firms where most of 
the effort goes into entries and exits are not that hands-on.51 The base idea with active own-
ership is that start-ups are challenging the status quo so their founders are often highly skilled 
in the science or technical area of the start-up but might be lacking in critical business skills, 
that is where the experience of the VC firm comes in. A VC firm can for example assist with 
strategic planning, recruitment and creating a more solid governance structure.52 Start-ups 
that are actively owned by VC firms perform on average better than their independent coun-
terparts.53 
 
The expected exit potential, time frame to maturity and the need for swift scalability create 
barriers for numerous industries and business models to gain VC investment. From the 
 
45 See Etula 2017 
46 In its “investment type” -category Crunchbase has Series A to J 
47 Crunchbase 2021 
48 FVCA “What are venture capital and private equity?” 
49 For start-ups with ambitions of going public receiving VC is a good sign. Half of the entrepreneurial com-
panies that go public in the US have had VC backing. 
50 Lerner and Nanada 2020 
51 Interview with Markus Dietrich, Analyst, Hadean Ventures (Stockholm, Sweden, 10th of July 2020) 
52 FVCA “What are venture capital and private equity?” 




600,000 new businesses that start their journey only a few thousand raise venture capital and 
just 7% of start-ups that file a patent have VC backing.54 
 
 
Figure 1. Venture capital investment by industry and region.55 
  
As the table demonstrates, the ICT industry is overwhelmingly the largest across all the re-
gions. The definition56 itself is quite all-encompassing but essentially the ICT industry fits 
the mould of an ideal investment target. ICT companies often have scalable products and 
business infrastructures are moderately easy to expand. As an example, SAAS companies 
like Dropbox57 or Mailchimp58 are quickly and cost-efficiently scalable and their products 
need for their product is similar across the globe. 
 
With the way technology has permeated into all aspects of our life the claim of being a 
technology company is relatively easy to make which is also an additional reason for the 
 
54 Kaplan and Lerner 2010 
55 Statista 2020 “Total value of venture capital investments in Europe in 2019, by sector”, FVCA 2019 “Finn-
ish Venture Capital Activity”, Pitchbook 2019 Although data may not perfectly comparable since definitions 
of industries by different sources might differ slightly. 
56 “The ICT sector combines manufacturing and services industries whose products primarily fulfil or enable 
the function of information processing and communication by electronic means, including transmission and 
display” OECD 
57 File hosting service that can just purchase more cloud storage space as the number of customers grows and 
online file storage is a product with basically no geographic blockers. (Dropbox.com) 
58 Marketing automation platform on which additional customers add no cost and like with Dropbox only ad-
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ICT sector attracting almost half of VC investments.59 Tech or ICT is starting to be too big 
of an umbrella term to actually give a descriptive label60 to a company and thus subcategories 
like fintech and healthtech are replacing it as they grow into their own large industries. VC 
firms might even specialize in a specific type of tech like fintech to gain an edge through 
more specialized market knowledge and the built network within that industry. On average 




Setups somewhat similar to those of modern VC covered in the previous introductory chap-
ter have been traced as far back as the twelfth century to Genova, Italy. The stay-at-home 
investor put forth most of the capital funding with the travelling merchant staying on the 
road practising his trade and paying back the entrusted capital.62 
 
The actual genesis of the concept we now know as venture capital came much later and is 
attributed to Georges Doriot. In a post-war America in 1946 Georges Doriot became the 
president of the American Research and Development Corporation. ARD was a public ven-
ture capital firm that over the 25-year tenure of Georges Doriot developed over 100 start-
ups utilizing the VC toolbox of financing and guidance63. Many of these start-ups became 
successes and became trailblazers in technology and business. The ARD also acted as an 
equalizer. Thanks to it individuals outside the wealthy family funds64 were able to get in-
volved in private equity and venture capital.65 
 
After its inception, the VC industry remained relatively modest in its impact until the 1980s. 
A new wave of capital hit the VC world in 1979 when the definition of a “prudent man’s” 
 
59 Baca 2019 (WP) 
60 The fact that VC firms and investors in general target ICT companies and give them higher valuation mul-
tiples because of their potential to grow and scale quickly and painlessly create an incentive to call yourself a 
tech company, even though you would not be one based on traditional definitions. A great example is the 
failed IPO of WeWork. WeWork’s main product is co-working spaces so the company should be categorized 
as a real estate company but WeWork used the word “technology” 93 times in its prospectus and used a high 
price/sales -ratio more typical of technology companies of 26x in its valuation. A similar-sized co-working 
company also targeting an IPO used a multiple of 3.5x around the same time raising flags. 
61 Gompers et al. 2009 
62 Krueger 1993 
63 Interestingly one of the companies was an oil rig manufacturing company run by George H.W. Bush 
64 Like the funds of the Rockefeller Brothers. 




care in investment in the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 was re-in-
terpreted66 by the Department of Labour to allow riskier investments by pension funds. At 
first, the pension funds just dipped their toes in by allocating small portions of their portfolios 
into start-ups but as the 1990s came and start-ups were leading the charge in new disruptive 
tech the investments grew and money flowed in, and not just into the start-ups, to curb risk 
pension funds invested in VC firms67.68  
 
The next major uptick in activity came in the mid-1990s. Plenty of new companies emerged 
spurred on by the so-called dot com boom. As a venture capitalist69 described the times: ”If 
you had a pulse and a neat haircut you were probably going to get funded”.70 The numbers 
back this up: in the year 1995 a bit under $10bn was invested in VC in the US, by the year 
2000 this number was a bit over $70bn representing a 55% annual growth rate in invest-
ments. In 2002 after the dotcom crash it was back to the original $10bn.71  The dotcom crash 
wiped out a lot of start-ups and VC firms, acting as a sort of reset for the system heading 
into the new millennia.72 
 
The post dotcom crash era experienced moderate growth in VC investments until the finan-
cial crisis of 2008 hit. The lack of liquidity and general risk averseness in the market became 
detrimental to the VC world. Most of VC funding at this point came from banks, pension 
funds and insurance companies all of which were deeply affected by the crisis. This caused 
three different actions from investors: 1. The financing institutions lowered their risk expo-
sure by cutting down on their investment levels in VC firms 2. They sold their stakes in VC 
firms and start-ups to alternative parties that might not be as reliable 3. They completely 
divested from VC. These actions led to the VC space shrinking, like post the dotcom crash, 
funding rounds into start-ups were almost halved in 2009 from 2008.73  
 
 
66 29 CFR § 2550.404a-1 - Investment duties in the ERISA 
67 The VC firms understood the market better and owning an equity stake in a VC firm instead of start-ups 
was an easier way to diversify. 
68 Lerner and Nanada 2020 
69 Ted Anderson, partner of Ventures West Management 
70 Conrath 2002 
71 Kaplan and Lerner 2010 
72 Laffey 2004 




In the years following the crisis, a clear trend has emerged of a growing number of large 
later stage investments into start-ups by a smaller pool of actors. When looking at the num-
bers of this stage, it seems like consolidation within the industry but actually, the type of 
firm investing VC is changing. The rise of corporate venture capital, mutual funds and sov-
ereign wealth funds in the VC space has shifted the norm of the market. For example, the 
Silicon Valley early stage investments are dominated by CVC firms like Google, Amazon 
or Facebook. This has led to the rise in the amount of angel and seed investors.74  
 
As chapter 2.1 pointed out, VC firms are not just moving into earlier stages but are also 
specializing because like in any maturing market competition grows and by focusing on a 
specific industry a more solid knowledge base can be utilized for attracting start-ups. The 
value-add of the firm is more attractive to a start-up when they can receive industry expertise 
on top of financial backing.75 New VC investors have also been more geographically diverse: 
in 2006-2007 80% of global VC investments happened in the US, by 2019 the portion is 
down to 50%.76  
 
The most recent impact to VC, as of writing the thesis, is the Covid-19 pandemic. As with 
the dotcom bubble burst and the financial crisis the expectations were very bleak for the VC 
space during the pandemic. The data emerging seems to contradict this. The main fallouts 
are that VC firms have somewhat slowed their investment pace and concentrated more on 
guiding their target companies through the pandemic. To quantify the effect: the VC indus-
try-wide IRR is down 1.6% which is far below what was at first expected.77 Like in the 
economy at large, the pandemic has not affected the VC space equally. For example, health-
tech has experienced a huge boom with the healthcare industry looking to digitalize its op-
erations. By Q3 in 2020 healthtech had taken in about 20% more investment than in the year 
2019 in total.78 The losing industries, like travel & tourism or beauty & fashion have been 
affected heavily losing 70% and 59% of their revenue respectively in comparison with last 
year.79 Many VC professionals pointed out that it is too early to see the real full impact of 
 
74 To possibly avoid competition with the powerful CVC firms for later stage companies.  
75 Harrison R 2019 
76 Lerner and Nanada 2020 
77 Gompers et al. 2020 
78 Pitchbook 2020 




the pandemic but based on the initial data it will permanently cause shifts in funding prefer-
ences and accelerate certain industries.80 
 




Like in the US, the genesis of VC-type activity can be tied to a public sector effort. In 1967 
the Bank of Finland, in collaboration with private financial institutions, founded Sponsori.81 
The goal of Sponsori, as the name implies82, was to help small Finnish businesses and ideas 
flourish and create exportable goods and services rather than turning a profit.83 The actual 
emergence of VC in its true form is attributed to Sitra in the 1980s, a foundation at the time 
also supervised by the Bank of Finland. Sitra has during its years of operation notably fi-
nanced the internationalization of Kone and funded the research behind the development of 
Xylitol.84 In the 1980s the activity of Sponsori also went through a transformation. To be 
able to take on more risky investments and isolate them Sponsori founded Spontel. Spontel 
was later criticized for contributing to the casino economy85 in Finland with its aggressive 
investing strategy taking on unreasonable amounts of risk and looking for quick returns.86   
 
In the early 1990s, Finland was in an economic depression with an almost 20% unemploy-
ment rate.87 During this period Sitra became the largest capital investor in Finland with the 
private sector for VC still in its infancy. Sitra was moved from the under the Bank of Finland 
to the Parliament of Finland and given an endowment of Nokia shares88.89 During this period, 
the capital raised by PE firms90 annually doubled in size YoY to reach €70mil in 1995.91 
 
 
80 See Gompers et al. 2020 
81 Pajarinen et al. 2016 
82 Sponsori translates to ”Sponsor” in English  
83 Vihola 2000 
84 Sitra “History” 
85 A time when the economy overheated and caused the depression of the 1990s in Finland. Started in the 
mid-1980s. 
86 Vihola 2000 
87 Kiander and Vartia 1998 
88 Nokia’s exponential growth of share value in the 1990s made the endowment much larger than intended. 
89 Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012 
90 Data on VC separately was not available till 2007. Might be because of the small market no distinction was 
needed. 




The dotcom bubble is too visible in the growth of Finnish venture investments from the mid-
1990s to 2001. The venture investments totalled €176mil in 2001, a number which is yet to 
be reached as of writing92, even pre the financial crisis of 2008. In years leading up to the 
financial crisis, the VC market also experienced a rally in the capital invested. The fall in 
investments after the dotcom bubble burst was almost 50% whereas post the financial crisis 
drop-off was just about 16%.93  
 
The resilience of VC in the US and Finland post the financial crisis of 2008 or the Covid-19 
pandemic might be a sign of its grown importance to the rejuvenation of the economy after 
a shock and the disruptive and adaptable nature of the lean start-ups that make it up. The 
change of millennia also marked a rise in soft values into investment space through VC firms 
increasingly valuing social impact on top of a return.94  
 
2.3.2 The Current State 
 
Since the financial crisis of 2008, a lot has happened in Finnish VC. The VC and start-up 
markets have experienced steady growth, gone through remarkable structural changes and 
even three new unicorns Rovio, Supercell and CRF Health95 have brought recognition to the 
ecosystem. 
 
Finland is ranked 7th in the Global Innovation Index 202096. The ranking is a good indicator 
of how fertile ground Finland is for start-ups and thus for VC firms. Based on the GII rank-
ing’s subcategories Finland’s biggest strength lies in its institutions97 and its most innovation 
hampering area is market sophistication98.99 The market will grow more sophisticated with 
time if the innovation input and output will stay at their current levels100 and the market will 
keep attracting more talent and capital. In comparison, the challenge of having weak IP pro-
tection in the ecosystem, for example, is a much harder obstacle to overcome since it requires 
 
92 Although in 2020 H1 was record high so it is likely the 2001 funding record will be broken in 2020. 
93 FVCA 2016 ”Venture Capital and Private Equity Industry in Finland 2015” 
94 Sitra “History” 
95 Supercell being the only one with any Finnish VC behind it. Accel (mentioned in Chapter 2.1 as the suc-
cessful investor in Facebook) backed both Rovio and Supercell. 
96 Finland has not dropped below 8th place since 2013. In 2014 Finland was even impressively 4th. 
97 Political environment, Regulatory environment, Business environment, Government effectiveness, Rule of 
law and Ease of resolving insolvency. 
98 Ease of getting credit, Ease of protecting minority investors and Intensity of local competition. 
99 WIPO 2020 




a colossal governmental effort and does not naturally subside like a lack of market sophisti-
cation. 
 
Since 2007 €1,45bn has been invested by Finnish VC firms with the average investment 
being €740k. In 2019 VC firms invested €158mil representing 14% YoY growth which is a 
bit over the average 12% YoY growth the investments in the Finnish VC sector have expe-
rienced since the financial crisis. To cover these investments €1,86bn of capital has been 
raised since 2007 by Finnish VC firms. The amount of raised capital has grown on average 
31% YoY101.102  
 
 
Figure 2. Investments made and funds raised by public and private Finnish VC funds103 
 
As it was earlier pointed out: the focus of Finnish VC firms is on the early stage of compa-
nies. Out of the €158mil invested in 2019, 18% went to the seed stage, 47% went to the early 
stage and 34% went to the later stage. The ratio has not always been quite so focused on the 
early stage. Up to the financial crisis, the focus of Finnish VC firms has been on later stage 
 
101 This demonstrates the irregular nature of raising capital. Years of growth and years of decline are alternat-
ing in capital raising but total investments made have a more of a steady rise. The standard deviations of 
€91mil in capital raised in comparison with €24mil in investments made confirm this. This is most likely the 
result of new funds being created. Raising a relatively large amount of capital for the fund’s inception in the 
still fairly small Finnish VC market will skew the statistics and make the funding graph look like a roller-
coaster. 
102 FVCA 2020 ”H1/2020 Finnish Private Equity Activity: Venture Capital” 
103 ibid 
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companies with up to 56% of invested capital104. As it was earlier mentioned, VC in the US 
has gone through an opposite shift. Big investments are flowing into the later stages because 
of CVCs and other new liquid players105 in the VC market. To compare the numbers 60% of 
VC goes to later stage in the US.106 This structural difference might disappear as Finland’s 
market matures and the needed larger players emerge. Currently, the lack of these more liq-
uid players in the Finnish VC market with the ability to finance more ambitious projects is 
something that is seen as a weakness, not just by local VC associations across the Nordics, 
but by the earlier mentioned GII.107 
 
Another structural change that is a sign of the market maturing that has already happened in 
Finland is the growth of the ratio of private-to-public VC in the market. The FVCA has 69 
members with 35 of them classified as VC firms.108 On top of this, there are a handful109 of 
public actors like the previously mentioned Sitra. The public share of capital invested in 
start-ups has shrunk from substantial to minuscule. In 2007 41% of VC investments made 
and 61% of the number of deals in Finland came from a public body. In comparison, in 2019 
21% of invested capital and 6% of the number of deals were made by a public fund. This 
represents the almost doubling of private investments110 and halving of public investments111 
over the 12-year period.  
 
These structural changes are welcome in the VC market since they are a sign of the strength-
ening of private VC firms as the goal of public VC is to fill funding gaps. A decline in 
activity means that there are fewer gaps to fill thanks to a robust private VC market. In a 
simplistic view, one could argue that capital is capital, and it makes no difference whether it 
come from a public or private source but as mentioned earlier, firms bring much more to the 
table than capital.  
 
 
104 In 2007 and 2008 
105 Sovereign wealth funds for example. The sheer capital these new actors are bringing to the market might 
be skewing the data with traditional VC firms still most likely focusing on earlier stages. 
106 Statista 2020 ”Value of venture capital investment deals in the United States 2019, by stage” 
107 Nordic Venture Capital and Private Equity Associations 2018 
108 FVCA ”Members” 
109 Business Finland Venture Capital, Finnvera, Sitra, Tesi 
110 Private investments in 2007: €76mil and 2019: €132mil. 




Active ownership is an important part of taking the start-up to the next level and public VC 
funds perform worse112 on average than private funds, even private & public partnerships 
perform worse than private funds113. There could be several reasons why this is the case. 
First of all, public VC is filling funding gaps, which are there for a reason. The gaps exist 
because of immense risk114 or that the target company’s mission is one that does not lead 
down the path of high profitability115 or profitability at all116. Secondly, the public VC funds 
are not able to nurture the investments in an equally effective manner as the private ones. 
The strength of public funds lies in their far-reaching networks in the innovation ecosys-
tem117. This network helps them identify ground-breaking projects early but not to manage 
the investments. As the study suggests, this should naturally move public VC into the earlier 
stages of the start-up lifecycle and private VC would step in when the investments are to be 
patented and shifted into a higher gear.118  
 
To quantify the power of active ownership by private VC firms in Finland two measures: 
the growth of turnover and increase in personnel are utilized. VC firms expect rapid growth 
and that is what they seem to get; the 5-year CAGR-% growth of turnover is almost six times 
as high119 as of the firms in the peer group120 at 42,4%121. With personnel growth, the 5-year 
CAGR-% growth of people employed was 2.6 times higher than in the peer group122 at 
11,6%.123 The growth is not of course not entirely linked to active ownership but is partly 
explained by the ability of VC firms to pick the firms with the most potential so the statistics 
are not just a testament of good active ownership but a portion of the success is owed to the 
capability of picking the “winners”. Even with their ability to pick winners, on average 65% 
of portfolio companies do not survive the lifetime of the fund.124 
 
 
112 In patents filed, which is the typical measure of innovation in start-ups. 
113 The study was done on UK VC which is more mature than the Finnish VC market, so applicability is not 
ideal. 
114 For example, an experimental therapy based on university research with a long time-to-market. 
115 Targeting a problem that is faced by a small number of people or a part of the population with low buying 
power. 
116 Firms that target the social or environmental ”profit” instead of financial. 
117 Universities or science parks for example. 
118 Pierrakis and Saridakis 2017 
119 6.5 times if Supercell is counted. 
120 Companies with over €100k turnover in 2016 in Finland excluding the 0,5% fastest growing and the 0,5% 
slowest growing companies that do not have VC funding. 
121 vs. 7,1% (Peer) 
122 vs. 4,4% (Peer)  
123 KPMG and FVCA 2019 




When the VC industry grows it is able to bring this growth to more and more start-ups and 
affect the economy at large, this growth extends beyond just the start-ups they are invested 
in. Every euro of return for investors has a 2 euro spill-over effect on the economy125.126 This 
in combination with the statistics on employment and revenue growth reinforce the idea of 
VC being a great stimulator for the economy and Finnish VC firms specifically being skilled 
in what they do. Keeping in mind the goal of the thesis; the potential impact the VC firms 
could have in the African communities they target, on top of the profit they take home, is 
promising.  
 
2.3.3 Legal Framework Along the Lifecycle of a Finnish VC firm 
 
The Global Innovation Index of 2020 ranks the Finnish rule of law as number 1 globally 
with a full 100 points.127 This means that the laws with which VC firms will interact are 
enforced to the highest standard; it does not comment on their suitability for innovation.128  
 
There is no specific law governing VC activities in Finland, the funds follow general corpo-
rate and contract law which are unfortunately not always suitable for the particularities of 
VC.129 The actual vehicle for investment, the VC fund, is ordinarily set up as a fixed term130 
limited partnership.131 The limited partnership in Finland enables for the “liability of one or 
more, but not all, of the partners for the partnership’s obligations to be132 limited to the 
amount of asset contribution specified in the partnership agreement”.133 The VC firm acts as 
the general partner managing the investments and taking on all the liability for the fund in 
the form of a limited company and the investors134 supply the capital for investments as the 
limited partners of the partnership for the fund.  
 
 
125 And this figure is on top of job creation and B2B purchases. 
126 Nordic Venture Capital and Private Equity Associations 2018 
127 WIPO 2020 “Finland” 
128 WIPO 2020 ”Conceptual Framework” 
129 Johansson et al. 2011 
130 The Partnership Act allows up to a 10-year fixed term partnership after which it can be liquidated at the 
behest of any partner unless another term of up to 10 years has been agreed during the first 10 years. This is 
the reason most likely behind the 10 years the typical fund lives (with possible extensions of a few years). 
131 PwC and FVCA 2006 
132 ”is” changed to ”to be” to make the sentence flow 
133 Section 1(2) of Chapter 1 of the Partnership Act 




The ability to set the fund up for a fixed term135 and having a lot of flexibility for the raising 
and distribution of capital make the limited partnership the favoured choice, and not just in 
Finland.136 Limited partnerships are also preferred in the US137 and elsewhere in Europe138 






















Figure 3. Structure of a VC fund 
 
Capital raised for the VC fund comes from pension funds, insurance funds, banks, funds, 
private investors and corporations.139 It is customary in Finland for the General Partner to 
put down 2 to 5% of the capital.140 This way the VC has “skin in the game” aligning their 
incentives with the limited partner. Research has also proven that by risking their own capital 
from their balance sheet the VC firm performs better as a fund manager. Higher the allotment 
of the VC firm better the returns, up to a point. The optimal amount of “skin in the game” 
 
135 The partnership period. 
136 PwC and FVCA 2006 
137 Litvak 2009 
138 Barnes 2007 
139 PwC and FVCA 2006 
140 Business Finland 2017 
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by the VC firm is a tight balancing act between motivation to perform and risk-averseness.141 
The infliction point for optimal performance by the GP has been found at 11.5% which is 
much higher than the Finnish market average.142 As an example, the Finnish VC firm Ice-
breaker143 has a 2% capital stake in its fund from 2018144. The largest serving of 30% of the 
fund belongs to Tekes145 and “Family offices and seasoned tech entrepreneurs” come in sec-
ond at 28%.146  
 
Once sufficient capital for the fund is raised it is time to scope out investments. When a 
potential target company is discovered147, the due diligence process starts. Due diligence can 
take anywhere from a few weeks to a couple of months depending on the complexity of the 
scrutinized company.148 Areas commonly covered are the product and the magic behind it, 
potential customers, the market, competition landscape, the management team’s expertise, 
the business model and financials149.150  
 
As start-ups are not publicly traded and their whole being is based on their propriety, the 
information the VC firm needs to make an investment decision is not publicly available. To 
get access to the inner workings of the target firm151 to get the information on the above-
mentioned areas an NDA needs to be signed. Based on the NDA template for Finnish VC 
firms provided by Business Finland the default non-disclosure period is 10 years. Breaking 
the agreement during this period results in a pre-determined financial penalty152 and when a 
disagreement about the violation of the NDA arises and is not reconciled through negotiation 
it is taken to arbitration.153 
 
141 The more of its own capital the VC firm has in the fund the more risk-averse its actions become. By risk-
ing too much of the fund’s capital it might not go for the same high-risk high-return ventures that the inves-
tors want since for them it is just a fraction of a portfolio but for the VC firm the future of the firm depends 
on investments. 
142 Ning and Wang 2017 
143 Icebreaker.vc 
144 Named Icebreaker Fund I Ky (Limited Partnership) 
145 Now Business Finland 
146 To see the full breakdown check Appendix A 
147 Start-ups are found through networks, events, incubators, hubs and by simply doing research into different 
databases or news articles. 
148 With start-ups that are science-heavy, like life science companies, the due diligence can take months be-
cause the VC firm’s scientists test the hypothesis. 
149 E.g. cash-burn, previous investments, revenues, cost-structures. 
150 Maloney et al. 2011 
151 Especially a sensitive case when the start-up is dealing with CVCs since the potential investor is also your 
competitor. As apparent in the case of Amazon’s Alexa Fund investing in DefinedCrowd and launching a 
competing product allegedly based on the information gathered through the due diligence process. 
152 Or a larger sum the wronged party is able to prove as the actual financial damage inflicted. 





When the due diligence is completed and the company seems like a good fit for the fund, the 
negotiations start. When the details are agreed upon, they are formulated in the investment 
agreement between the fund and the target company. Through the negotiations the VC firm 
and the start-up attempt to find a valuation that enables the start-up to receive enough capital 
to reach the goals they set with the VC without losing too much equity themselves. Typically, 
the investment agreement holds, besides the valuation, a set of representations and warran-
ties, protections for investors154 and a limitation of liability.155  
 
As the start-up is most likely a limited liability company, the investment by the fund is done 
through equity financing. Shares are issued by the start-up for the fund156.157 The shares the 
start-up issues are new and they dilute the ownership of current shareholders in the company. 
It is a red flag for the VC fund if the entrepreneur is trying to exit, in any way, in the early 
stages when the fund is joining the journey like by selling their own shares instead of issuing 
new ones.158 
 
The valuation of the start-up is something that is a challenge for VC firms. The start-ups are 
often very early stage and traditional financial methods159 used in PE or when investing on 
the stock exchange are not applicable. The value of start-ups is not based on their sales or 
the ability to pay dividends but rather on intangible assets like patents, the idea or the exper-
tise of the entrepreneur. Basically, assets are priced that are hard to put a price on beforehand 
without a lot of assumptions160. It is no wonder VC valuations are seen more as an art than 
an exact science.161   
 
 
154 Examples of these protections: restrains of trade for founders and key employees, liquidation preference, 
anti-dilution protections, right to participate pro rata in future equity raises and offers of shares for sale, tag 
along rights, exit or liquidity rights, board appointment rights, reserved matter/veto rights and information 
rights. 
155 Krogerus 2013 Presentation 
156 To most often gain a minority non-controlling stake in the company. 
157 Chapter 9 of the Limited Liability Company Act  
158 FVCA 2018 “Näin haet pääomasijoitusta -opas yrittäjälle” 
159 Discounted cash flows or comparable multiples for example.  
160 These intangible assets are looked at through the lens of rather measurable estimations like time-to-exit or 
cash-burn. These help the VC firm estimate the amount of dilution they will have to experience before they 
can cash exit their investment. 




Once an investment is made by the fund, the process of growing the business for the exit 
starts. During this period, the VC fund gives advice and assistance to the start-up through a 
board seat which is often a requirement set out in the investment agreement.162 A not so 
encouraging statistic for this part of the VC firm and start-up partnership journey is the fact 
that the protection of minority owners is seen as especially weak in Finland. GII ranks Fin-
land 60th globally in minority owner protection. The rank is below all three African nations 
covered in the thesis.163  
 
The power within a Limited Liability Company is based on the principle of majority rule164. 
For protection to work minority shareholders need to react to the abuse brought on by the 
actions of the majority. The protection of minority shareholders, in this case, the VC firms, 
can be divided into automatic “passive” protection and “active” protection. Passive protec-
tion arises from the principle of equal treatment of shareholders, obstructionism provisions, 
procedural provisions for capital distribution and acceptance of measures undertaken by 
shareholders. Active protection requires often requires the minority shareholder to use their 
voice in the shareholder meeting and make a request165 based on the Limited Liability Com-
panies Act or the company’s bylaws.166  
 
During the period of active ownership, no major legal changes to the relationship happen 
unless there is conflict and the minority owner utilizes one of the above-mentioned methods 
or the VC fund extends further capital through further equity financing or by giving a bridge 
loan to reach a milestone. The bridge loan can in a few forms, it can be a debt-to-equity 
loan167 or just a traditional loan.168  
 
 
162 Pankkiiriliike Evli Oy 2001 
163 WIPO 2020 “Finland” 
164 The power of 50%+ of the votes trumps the rest. The defence of equal treatment is more a restrictive force 
on the majority than a power of the minority.  
165 The right to once request that a matter concerning the approval of the annual accounts of the annual gen-
eral meeting and the use of profits be transferred to an extension meeting, right to demand an auditor, right to 
require special inspection, right to demand the distribution of minority dividends, right to demand that the 
merger be decided at the general meeting, the right to demand that the split be decided at the general meeting 
and the right to pursue an action in the name of the company in favour of the company if it is probable at the 
time of the action that the company itself will not take care of the execution of the claim for damages. 
166 Pönkä 2014 
167 Though the typical purpose of using debt-to-equity is kind of useless in VC since if the project succeeds 
the company will get equity and, in most cases, if the project fails there is no capital left in the company to 
pay the debt. So all roads lead to equity. But often the reasoning is that additional equity worsens the internal 
rate of return and dilution might not be welcome after a certain point.  




When a company becomes one of the lucky 35% of companies in the VC fund’s portfolio 
that survive the 10-year run-time of the fund it is time for the VC firm to exit its position. In 
Finland 52% of exits happen by trade sale, 11% by IPO, 24% by sale to another PE/VC firm 
and the remaining 13% of exits fall into various categories169. The most common method, 
trade sale, is a pretty straightforward sale of the VC fund’s shares to a company most likely 
working in the same industry looking to buy innovation instead of investing in R&D170. The 
purchase is performed by a sale of shares currently held to the party barring possible lack of 
consent from current shareholders (if the clause has been agreed on) or one of the current 
shareholders exercising their redemption right (also needs to be agreed on) for the shares.171 
The exit by sale to another PE/VC firm works in a similar manner, just the purpose for pur-
chase is different and the start-up stays independent instead of being most likely integrated 
into a new company through a trade sale.  
 
IPOs are the holy grail of exits because they bring the highest returns for the VC funds out 
of all the exit methods. If the IPO happens before the fund needs to be liquidated the fund 
typically waits with a major holding of up to 75% of their initial investment until they need 
to liquidate to maximize their return and build their credibility as a fund in managing start-
ups.172 Another important reason for the VC fund to stick around through the listing is the 
positive impact this has on the value of the firm to new investors. The VC fund has advised 
the firm along its path towards the IPO which shows a track record of good management and 
compatibility, losing this devalues the company.173  
 
In Finland, the IPO method of exit is less common than in the rest of the Nordics174, espe-
cially in comparison with Sweden which has an active micro and small-cap market.175 To 
quantify the difference we can look at IPOs of the First North Market176 in 2020 by coun-
try177 Sweden had 42 IPOs, Denmark 11 and Finland 3.178 To go public in Finland there are 
 
169 For example, repurchase by the start-up’s management 
170 Other reasons could be the purchase of the IP, buying out competition or expertise of the team. 
171 Pajarinen et al. 2016 and Chapter 3 Sections 6 to 8 of the Limited Liability Companies Act 
172 Neus 2005 
173 Jeppson 2018 
174 Finland 11% of exits are IPOs vs. 14% in Denmark, 18% in Sweden and 14% in Norway 
175 DVCA et al. 2018 
176 A market ”enabling Nordic and international entrepreneurs to access growth capital to develop and expand 
their businesses” (https://www.nasdaq.com/solutions/nasdaq-first-north-growth-market) 
177 Norway does not have a First North Marketplace. 




certain requirements the enlisting company needs to fulfil.179 The requirements to list on the 
First North are less stringent with less mandatory disclosure, lower capital requirements and 
no required track record of financial statements than in the main Nasdaq market. First North 
has a low enough bar for basically an idea to be listed as long as there is sufficient working 
capital for 12 months.180 Even with the option of the easier listing through First North, Finn-
ish start-ups and VC funds seem to prefer the exit method of selling the shares outright to a 
third-party company. There could be a myriad of reasons for this: the costs and risks associ-
ated with listing, the need for the VC firm to stick around through and after the listing or the 
fact that VC firms enter and leave companies in Finland, on average, so early that IPO does 
not even come into consideration.181  
 
If the start-up is one of the 65% that experience failure the VC fund will have to deal with 
insolvency of the target company. Failure is part of the start-up culture, even sometimes 
celebrated to dispel the fear around it.182 Using the GII ranking again as a reference, Finland 
is ranked number one globally in the “ease of resolving insolvency”.183 The fallout for the 
VC fund is more financial than causing any processes or responsibilities. Once the start-up 
or its lenders successfully apply for bankruptcy the VC fund makes a write-off in the value 
of the capital invested in the start-up and moves on.184 
 
All the successful exit routes mentioned in the earlier paragraphs work into the average TVPI 
of the Nordics of 1,2 which is higher than the European average of 0,7185.186 The average 
20% return187 is paid out using the standard “2 and 20”188 rule. The 2 represents the 2% 
annual management fee on the invested capital by the limited partners which can be taken 
of the principal or charged separately189 and the 20 represents the 20% cut the fund takes 
 
179 Pörssisäätiö 2016 
180 Nasdaq and Hannes Snellman 2019 
181 See Talouselämä 2018 
182 See Koskinen 2020 
183 WIPO 2020 “Finland” 
184 PwC and FVCA 2006 
185 Every euro put into VC in the Nordics gives €1,2 back and in Europe €0,7 (a €0,3 loss on each euro put 
in). TVPI is the best way to measure PE or VC returns and unfortunately, the data is from 2015. But it gives 
an indication of strong performance in the Nordic’s. 
186 DVCA et al. 2018 
187 Which is way below the TVPI of 3 expected by investors. 
188 With some variations 




from the profit190 it manages to generate over an agreed-upon hurdle-rate. The hurdle rate is 
the minimum return that the investors expect on their capital from the VC firm managing 
the fund.191 The hurdle-rate depends on myriad factors from the riskiness of the investment 
mandate to the previous track record of the fund managers. It is often in the 0-10% range.192 
 
The final step to cover in the legal life of the fund is the unavoidable, taxes. From a VC fund 
point of view, it is quite simple: if the fund is a limited partnership the fund is looked through 
and treated as an accounting unit with the taxation happening at the level of the partners after 
the capital has been allocated.193 Taxation is one of the reasons limited partnership are so 
popular; they create a clear division between the investors and the active fund managers 
when the time comes to divide the loot.194  
 
The VC firm, in the form of a limited liability company, managing the fund as a general 
partner treats the management fee and the post-hurdle-rate profit share as revenue which gets 
taxed at the corporate tax rate of 20%. The limited partners, in the same way, deal with taxes 
as if they would have invested straight in the underlying companies with the rate of tax 
depending on the form in which the profit is distributed back: dividends, interest or the sale 
of shares. The process gets a bit more complicated with foreign investors when withholding 
rates have to be taken into account and double taxation might become an issue.195 Although 
this does not seem to be an obstacle for foreign investors who now make up 62%196 of in-
vested capital in Finland. The attraction of foreign capital in recent years has made Finland 
the number one nation in Europe for VC investment197 as a % of GDP. The taxation impact 
on VC funds and firms investing in Africa will be covered in the later chapters concerning 




190 For example, if a €100mil fund is at €180mil when it is time to liquidate: the fund has received €20mil in 
management fees (€100mil*2%*10years) and €8mil in profit share from profit above the hurdle rate of 40% 
on the €100mil ((€80mil-€40mil)*20%)  for a combined total of €28mil and the limited partners receive the 
rest (€152mil). 
191 CFI 2021 and Paasi 2014 (Nordnet) 
192 Buzzacchi et al. 2015 
193 Section 6(4) of the Business Income Tax Act  
194 PwC and FVCA 2006 
195 Johansson et al. 2011 
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3 Venture Capital in Africa 
 
3.1 Current Level of Investment 
 
The composition of the external capital flows into the African continent has experienced a 
shift in the recent decade. Foreign direct investments have overtaken remittances198 and of-
ficial development assistance as the major source of capital.199 The shift is the result of strong 
economic growth in the region. It has expanded the middle-class consumer base making the 
continent more attractive for businesses.200 VC activity in Africa has grown in symbiosis 
with the economy, expanding and helping generate even more innovation and bolstering 
further growth.201 
 
One metric that showcases the growth Africa has been experiencing is the increase in the 
value of total VC deals in recent years. In 2014 $0.4bn VC was invested in Africa. Five years 
later the same figure is $1.4bn representing a CAGR of 28%. The $1.4bn has four major 
geographical targets: 21% of the capital goes to companies headquartered outside of Africa 
with the capital going towards African expansion, 21% to South Africa, 18% to Kenya and 
14% to Nigeria.202 Later chapters will uncover the reason why these countries attract over 
half of the invested VC203.  
 
Start-ups are a reflection of what challenges society faces and in Africa, the industries that 
attract the most investment are more capital intense than the top industries in the EU, US or 
Finland which are more high-tech focused. The distribution of capital invested by industry 
in Africa is different to the US, EU and Finland.204 Consumer Discretionary is the leading 
industry in Africa attracting 28% of VC followed by Fintech (23%) and tight third and fourth 
places are occupied by Industrials (18%) and Utilities (17%).205 This distribution of favoured 
 
198 Money sent home by an emigrant. 
199 Sy 2015 (Brookings) 
200 African Development Bank 2020 
201 AVCA 2020 ”Venture Capital in Africa: Mapping Africa’s start-up investment landscape” 
202 ibid 
203 When you take into account that 53% goes to the countries covered in the thesis and another 21% goes to 
firms headquartered outside the continent this leaves 26% of invested capital for the rest of the countries out 
of which Ghana and Egypt are another 13% leaving 13% of the $1.4bn, $182mil, for the remaining 49 coun-
tries on the continent.  
204 To see the industry division of these geographic areas see Figure 1. 




VC investment target industries showcase some of the structural challenges the continent is 
still facing.206 
 
The deal volume to capital invested ratio confirms the thesis of Africa needing capital heavy 
investments in the VC space. ICT is 19% of the deal volume but only 6% of capital invested 
which shows high activity but a relatively low cost of acquisition and thus operation. In 
comparison, industries like utilities, industrials and consumer discretionary attract a com-
bined 53% of invested capital but just 43% of deal volume. The same goes for communica-
tion services which are only 3% less in deal volume (8%) than utilities (11%) but receive 
just 3% of VC.207  
 
An industry that most reflects the challenges that Africa faces is fintech. A continent where 
traditional banking has a very weak reach but mobile phone adoption is high creates an op-
portunity for innovative fintech solutions. In 2011 Sub-Saharan Africa had the largest share 
of unbanked and underbanked population globally.208 Six years later Africa had the largest 
share of population with mobile money accounts209 globally.210 M-Pesa, founded and cur-
rently owned by Vodafone and Safaricom211, paved the way for Fintech with its mobile pay-
ing platform that handled over 12 billion transactions212 in 2019.213 
 
Countless competing fintech start-ups have launched across Africa in recent years, filling 
the gap left by traditional banks, attracting large amounts of VC. Most notable examples of 
this are the Nigerian fintech start-ups OPay, Flutterwave and PalmPay raising a combined 
almost $300mil214 in VC.215 OPay and PalmPay have quite similar stories: both are Lagos-
based, both were founded in 2019 and both received funding216 and incubation from 
China.217 The power of Fintech, enabling people to start saving and being fiscally responsi-
ble, has and will play a key role in the acceleration of African development. 
 
206 See Spender et al. 2017 
207 AVCA 2020 ”Venture Capital in Africa: Mapping Africa’s start-up investment landscape” 
208 World Bank 2014 ”Global Findex 2014” 
209 Over 20% estimated compared to the global average of 2%. 
210 World Bank 2017 ”Global Findex 2017” 
211 Largest mobile operator in Africa 
212 To put this in context Klarna handled 365million transactions in 2019. 
213 Vodafone 2021 
214 To put this in perspective it is double the total capital invested in the Finnish VC market in 2019. 
215 Crunchbase ”Flutterwave” 
216 OPay $170mil and PalmPay $40mil 





The distribution of funding of start-ups in Africa by stage of investment is quite similar to 
Finland: about a third of all VC deals went to seed stage companies from 2014 to 2019.218 
Also, 65% of the investment rounds in Africa were below $5mil so even with mostly capital 
heavy industries receiving the funding VC funds are joining the game with relatively small 
investments so the barrier to entry from a financial standpoint is modest.219 
 
A factor that differentiates African VC from others globally is the share of investments com-
ing from impact funds. From 2014 to 2019 44% of deals had at least one impact investor220 
as part of them.221 VC impact investing is on the rise. As social and environmental challenges 
are rising priorities in society firms are taking the principles and practices utilized in VC to 
create positive change and a risk-adjusted financial return222 and what better place to do it 
than in Africa, where every investment is an impact investment.223 
 
3.2 Geographic Division of VC Investors in Africa 
 
3.2.1 African Firms 
 
The birth of VC in Africa can be attributed to the founding of the Johannesburg Venture 
Capital Club in the mid-1980s. The members were local law firms, PE managers, the In-
dustrial Development Corporation224 and various other businesses. The first government-
backed VC fund of Africa, Technifin225, was also established in South Africa a few years 
after the Venture Capital Club in 1992.226 The 1990s are seen as the time in Africa when VC 
got more established through mostly domestic and foreign governmental efforts like Tech-
nifin or the New Africa Opportunity Fund for South Africa by OPIC227 with the goal to assist 
small business growth and stimulate the economy.  
 
218 AVCA 2020 ”Venture Capital in Africa: Mapping Africa’s start-up investment landscape” and FVCA 
2020 ”H1/2020 Finnish Private Equity Activity: Venture Capital” 
219 AVCA 2020 ”Venture Capital in Africa: Mapping Africa’s start-up investment landscape” 
220 In Finland, 58% of funds say they take social and environmental impact into consideration and 87% of 
funds believe that it does not affect their profit but there are only actually a few funds that are categorized as 
impact investors. (FVCA Press Release 2019) 
221 AVCA 2020 ”Venture Capital in Africa: Mapping Africa’s start-up investment landscape” 
222 Cetindamar and Ozkazanc-Pan 2017 
223 Interview with Tito Cookey-Gam from Echo VC on the 18th of March 2021 
224 A fund established in the 1940s to fund small and medium enterprises of the Afrikaans community to 
combat poverty. 
225 Was in operation for two years after which its portfolio was transferred to the South African Inventions 
Development Corporation. 
226 Lingelbach et al. 2009 





The main catalyst to all this happening in the 1990s was the change of approach to financial 
aid globally. Equity investing was seen as a better way to support development than loan-
based financing. Equity-based investing incentivises better support for the businesses. 
Through equity financing, the investors become equals with the business owners and align 
the interests of both parties. It incentivizes the investors to maximize profits of the enterprise 
over the long term, not just get their principal and interest back which was the old model of 
debt-based financial aid.228 
 
The first private African domestic VC funds started popping up in the mid to late 1990s like 
the firm Africinvest229 which was founded in Tunisia in 1994 or the Nigerian African Capital 
Alliance founded in 1998. As Africinvest started broadening its investment horizon to other 
North African countries it helped found The African Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Association in 2000.230 AVCA, much like FVCA, promotes and enables VC investment in 
the region through education, research and networking.231 
 
Private financing in the African start-up ecosystem in the 1990s and late 2000s was domi-
nated by foreign investors with most of the capital being impact investments. In more recent 
years, for-profit VC funds founded on the continent have been growing their presence. From 
2014 to 2019 20% of the investors participating in VC deals came from one of the 54 African 
countries.232 Out of these African VC funds, South African investors are the most active with 
9% of investments followed by Nigerian investors at 4% with Egypt being third at 2%.233 
Another testament to the rise of African VC firms has been the fact that three out of the six 
most active dealmakers from 2019 to H1 of 2020 were domestic VC firms: Novastar Ven-
tures234, Algebra Ventures235 and CRE Venture Capital236. Combined they were part of 32 
deals in the 1.5-year period measured. 237 The only firm that made more deals in Africa than 
 
228 AVCA 2018 ”An Untold Story: The Revolution of Responsible Investing in Africa” 
229 $1.7bn AUM with over 160 companies invested in across 25 African countries. A partner of the firm, 
Khaled Jilani, was one of the African investors interviewed for the thesis to find solutions to the obstacles.   
230 AVCA 2018 ”An Untold Story: The Revolution of Responsible Investing in Africa” 
231 AVCA 2021 ”About” 
232 AVCA 2020 ”Venture Capital in Africa: Mapping Africa’s start-up investment landscape” 
233 Irwin-Hunt 2020 (FDI Intelligence) 
234 Kenyan firm, Novastarventures.com 
235 Egyptian firm, Algebraventures.com 
236 South African, CRE.vc 




the number two, Novastar Ventures, was 500 Startups, the world’s most active VC firm of 
the year238 for the second year running.239 
 
3.2.2 Global Firms 
 
The attitudes of global firms towards Africa is changing. With the population growth and 
economic development Africa is experiencing, funds do not want to miss out on the oppor-
tunity of getting into the market early. Also, as many of the countries have become more 
pro-business and democratic funds are more comfortable making investments on the conti-
nent. This has led to the fly-in, fly-out model slowly disappearing and global VC funds set-
ting up offices in Africa to be closer to the start-ups and capture more of the local talent. 
When funds decide to venture into Africa, they have many ways to approach the ecosystem 
with some funds taking the generalist approach while others focus on a certain country or 
industry.240 
  
Currently, the 80% of global VC firms that invest in the region are almost a microcosm of 
the distribution of VC funding globally. From 2014 to 2019 the space has been dominated 
by US founded firms with 40% of total investments. Though 40% might seem like a lot it is 
still below their 50% market share globally.241 The reason for this lower share of US capital 
is the heightened activity of Chinese VC funds in Africa in recent years. In 2019 Chinese 
funds represented 18% of invested capital242 followed by the UK at 8%.243  
 
With 40% of total investments, US VC funds are drivers of the start-up space on the conti-
nent. Distinguished top US VC firms have led the way. Firms like 500 Startups or Accel 
have started monitoring and investing in Africa in recent years more actively. 500 Startups 
has been quite true to their name with already 71 active VC investments in ten different 
African countries.244 CVCs have also shown their growing interest in the region by more 
frequent visits and infrastructure investments.245 Google recently opening an AI research 
 
238 285 investments in 2019 out of which 20 were made in Africa. The firm also made the most exits in the 
world in 2019 with 41 exits, 31 of which in the US. 
239 GlobeNewsWire 2020 
240 AVCA 2014 ”Guide to Private Equity in Africa” 
241 Lerner and Nanada 2020 
242 Digest Africa 2020 
243 Irwin-Hunt 2020 (FDI Intelligence) Though Japanese firms were mentioned earlier, their impact on the 
market is yet to be seen in the data since the move has been very recent. 
244 500 Startups 2021 ”Portfolio” 




centre in Ghana and an accelerator program for African start-ups are a great example of 
this.246  
 
China’s VC firms’ interest in Africa has deepened as a result of the One Belt One Road 
initiative247.248 A statistic that shows the exponential growth of Chinese VC flooding the 
African market is the fact that 2% of total investments in Africa came from China between 
2014 and 2019249 but when looking just at 2019 China already represents 18% of invested 
capital.250 When Chinese VC firms invest, they invest big; three out of the six largest invest-
ment rounds in 2019 came from Chinese VC firms.251  
 
UK based firms being third at 8% of participation from 2014 to 2019 in VC is higher than 
their global average of 5,1%.252 UK’s relationship with Africa is unique since many of the 
target countries are former colonies with UK’s cultural and legal imprint still part of their 
business structures making investing in the region easier.253 As an example one of the UK’s 
best known VC firms, Playfair Capital254, has opened a fund to invest in Africa with the 
founder255 moving to the continent to support the fund better in its journey into the “frontier 
markets”.256 As evident from this chapter these “frontier markets” seem to be attracting 
growing interest from investors globally with the acclaimed firms from the largest VC coun-
tries making the first moves. 
 
3.2.3 Finnish Firms 
 
The small amount of material found for this chapter shows just how untapped of a market 
African start-ups are for Finnish VC firms. Currently, VC investment activity into any 
 
246 Google Blog 2018 and Google Startup 2021 
247 Revealed to the world in 2013 and also referred to as the New Silk Road, the OBOR is an infrastructure 
investment project stretching from China to Europe. Through investing in railways, energy pipelines etc. be-
tween China and Europe OBOR is creating a more globally connected China. Critics of the initiative say it is 
a borrowing trap for developing governments with a goal for China to extend its political power globally 
through using debt as leverage to influence countries along the OBOR into political submission. 
248 See Ehizuelen 2017 
249 AVCA 2020 ”Venture Capital in Africa: Mapping Africa’s start-up investment landscape” 
250 Digest Africa 2020 
251 EMPEA 2020 ”Trends In Global VC+Tech EMPEA’s Inaugural Report On Venture-Backed Startups 
Across EM” 
252 Graham 2019 (TopTal) 
253 See Murray-Evans 2016 
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emerging markets is minimal but as discussed earlier that was a major motivator behind this 
thesis to figure out why this is the case and what can be done for it to change. 
 
Currently, almost a third257 of VC invested by Finnish firms goes outside of Finland.258 To 
break this number down further: 89% of Finnish VC firms invest outside of Finland, 41% 
invest outside the Nordics and Baltics and 30% invest outside of Europe259. Interestingly, 
size does not correlate with more geographic outreach. It seems to be more the generalist vs. 
specialized approach that divides the firms’ willingness to seek targets globally. When you 
know an industry inside out, as a specialized VC firm, it makes less of a difference from 
where you source your investments. Since the goal of a start-up is to go global and your 
potential target companies are fewer and further between than for generalist firms. Being 
geographically picky in that case does not add value for the investors.260 
 
The closest thing to a Finnish VC firm actively investing in Africa is FinnFund. FinnFund 
“is a development financier which builds a sustainable world by investing in responsible and 
profitable businesses in developing countries” financed by the Finnish government.261 The 
latest annual review of FinnFund highlights the fact that almost half of their portfolio targets 
are in Africa and they expect to see further strong interest and growth in the region. A great 
example of a FinnFund investment in Africa that would meet the criteria of a VC investment 
is Sanergy262. Sanergy is a Kenya-based start-up into which FinnFund invested €1mil as part 
of its Series A in 2016.263 Following this, Sanergy has received over €11mil in funding to 
date from all over the globe and serves almost 100,000 customers daily. In 2020 Sanergy 
closed a Series C funding of €2.5mil from AXA264.265  
 
Another FinnFund investment target, Fuzu, is the only investment in Africa that has Finnish 
VC behind it. Fuzu received €3.4mil Series A funding from Sparkmind266 in 2020 and 
 
257 28% in 2019, 27% in 2018 and the yearly average since 2007 is 20% 
258 FVCA 2020 ”H1/2020 Finnish Private Equity Activity: Venture Capital” 
259 Though mostly this means the US. 
260 Manually going through every Finnish VC firm in the FVCA Members page (https://paaomasijoit-
tajat.fi/en/fvca/members/#jasenet) 
261 Finnfund 2021 
262 A Kenya-based start-up providing “non-sewered sanitation solutions that serve all urban residents and are 
5 times cheaper than sewers” (http://www.sanergy.com/) 
263 FinnFund 2020 
264 A French insurance company with over €100bn of annual revenue. (https://www.axa.com/) 
265 Crunchbase ”Sanergy” 
266 A Finnish VC firm focused on the learning sector which goes to prove the point that specialists are more 




FinnFund had invested €1.8mil of Seed Capital in 2016.267 Fuzu is a “one stop shop for the 
largest selection of open jobs, insights into the East African job market268, tailored career 
advice and skill training.” 269 To classify Fuzu as a strictly African start-up is hardly possible 
since Fuzu has two Finnish founders and is currently domiciled in Finland though all of its 
operations are in the African market even receiving Kenyan VC270 early on to support ex-
pansion.271 This fusion venture and FinnFunds efforts will hopefully be the trailblazers pav-
ing the road for many more investments and start-ups on the continent with active Finnish 
ownership. 
 
3.3 The Investment Process in Africa for a Finnish Firm 
 
This chapter will cover the process of VC investing in a foreign country. By going through 
the process step-by-step as in Chapter 2.3.3. The chapter will highlight the differences and 
the inevitable challenges that come with cross-border investing.272 Chapter 4 will then build 
on and supplement the investment process laid out providing specifics e.g. the taxation lev-
ied on profit. The chapter is written from the point of view of a Finnish VC that would invest 
in Africa. 
 
The first few steps for a hypothetical firm wanting to invest in Africa are similar to those 
covered in Chapter 2.3.3. The VC firm sets up a limited partnership in Finland and finds 
investors for the fund as limited partners. The differences start when the fund is up and run-
ning with sufficient capital ready to invest.  
 
The first decision a VC firm venturing to Africa needs to make is the type of vehicle used 
for investment and what kind of local support it requires. There are countless possibilities of 
setting up “vehicle structures” to reach the target start-up from the Limited Partnership.273 
The factors that influence the decision on what kind of a structure to use are taxes, costs, 
ease of exit and risk.274  
 
 
267 Crunchbase ”Fuzu” 
268 By 2040 Africa is expected to have the largest global job market. 
269 Fuzu 2021 
270 From the firm Cornerstone Enterprises with a 5mil portfolio of investments. 
271 Sparkmind.vc 2020 Press Release 
272 Mäkelä and Maula 2008 
273 This could be a thesis topic in itself. 




Taxes are country-specific so they are better covered in the individual country profiles but 
simply put: if the firm wants to minimize the tax burden and avoid double taxation the treaty 
network of the start-up’s domicile country determines what type of structure is optimal.275 
For example, the start-up’s domicile country might not have a bilateral tax treaty with Fin-
land so opening an investment vehicle276 in Luxembourg277 that the VC firms Limited Part-
nership owns 100% of for its investments outside of Europe might be the best solution. The 
€9bn invested in VC through these Luxembourg fund vehicles might attest to their suitabil-
ity.278 Although it is important to remember that the more subsidiaries the fund opens the 
more complex, especially the exit, and costly the operation becomes.279 
 
After the appropriate form of reaching the chosen African market has been established the 
VC firm needs to figure out what type of, if any, local support it requires. To navigate the 
new ecosystem hiring at least a local lawyer for assistance early on is advised. On top of that 
getting in touch with incubators, investor networks and local research firms will help the VC 
firm form a better information base of the new landscape. More involved, and costly, support 
can be received from consulting firms280 that specialize in advising investments in emerging 
markets. They provide experience and current market insights that can save a VC firm a lot 
of trouble and capital as it ventures out to Africa for the first time.281  
 
When the choice of a partner is made, the sourcing of an investment target begins. The 
abovementioned partners, especially incubators and investor networks are of great help at 
this point if the VC firm has not ventured out with a specific firm in mind. Another option 
for finding an investment target is partnering with a local VC investor. Having a “home” 
investor as part of the deal process gives it a stamp of approval with local knowledge282 and 
 
275 Cockfield 2010 
276 There are four main vehicles in Luxembourg for VC: Special Limited Partnerships (basically a limited 
partnership with more contractual freedom and flexibility), SICARs (a vehicle specially designed for risky 
VC investment), Reserved Alternative Investment Funds (offer a non-regulated version of the SICAR) and 
The European Venture Capital Fund (created for VC firms that want the EU label and can market their fund 
with it). 
277 A country with an extensive tax treaty network making it a perfect domicile for investment vehicles. 
278 DLA Piper 2019  
279 See Ndemo and Weiss 2017 
280 For example: CrossBoundary (https://www.crossboundary.com/), African Venture Advisors (https://afri-
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281 See Global Impact Investing Network and Open Capital 2015 
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with both having equity the goals are aligned creating a good base for collaboration. Besides 
the stamp of approval, the local VC is able to alleviate frictions that might arise from cultural 
differences when investing or during active ownership of the investment.283 Research into 
other emerging markets shows that VC investments done in partnerships are more likely to 
reach a successful exit.284 
 
The due diligence process for evaluating target start-ups for investment is not radically dif-
ferent when investing in Africa. The firm still gets to practice its valuation art with its internal 
requirements and models the same way it would analyse a local start-up. Like with finding 
the targets for due diligence the mentioned local partners help close gaps of information 
asymmetry and cultural disparity in due diligence too.285 
 
The actual act of investing is determined by the domicile of the start-up and the vehicle 
chosen for investment. As the valuation and equity stake is negotiated the tactics used might 
feel confusing and foreign for both parties involved286 assistance from a local lawyer at this 
point is vital. The minimal assistance required is related to drawing up the contract and guid-
ing the parties through the potentially differing norms.287 All three African countries focused 
on in this thesis have a common law legal system with English origins which differs in its 
approach to contracts. They are much more narrowly construed and precise leading to much 
more complex and lengthy documents that leave little to interpretation.288 
 
The active ownership stage is the point at which political risk and the risk of a weak legal 
system can materialize in emerging markets. The political and regulatory spaces play a big 
part in forming what is referred to as an entrepreneurial environment.289 Political risk brings 
with it the potential for sudden unfavourable and discriminatory policy changes, instabilities 
like war or political violence, currency issues290, restriction of vital resources for the start-
up or even expropriation or nationalization.291 As political risk clearly can affect the start-
up’s chances of success a correlation in willingness to invest and the stability of the political 
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environment has been found.292 Although as a counterpoint, there are certain start-up indus-
tries like software where the firm could be based anywhere and there are no physical reve-
nue-generating assets to worry over, except the human capital, so an unstable political envi-
ronment should not affect the valuation and potential of these firms in the same manner as it 
does for example for an early-stage biotech company. This makes tech VC investing more 
resilient to the environment and there should be a lower threshold for VC investments than 
for larger FDIs from a legal and political risk angle. 
 
The legal system of a country also affects the transparency, management and predictability 
of transactions. The main concrete legislatorial areas affecting VC firms investing in foreign 
markets are: governance structure of a firm, rules on bankruptcy, regulations governing cred-
itors, IP protection, minority protection and taxation all of which will be covered in the 
country profiles since, as with taxes, the heterogeneity of legislation in these areas across 
Africa requires country-by-country analysis.293  
 
A potentially unifying fallout factor of weak legal systems across emerging markets are 
transaction costs and unpredictable informal institutions born to plug the holes left by weak 
or inept governmental institutions.294 The transaction costs that might mount in emerging 
markets are born from uncertainty.295 This leads to the incentive for VC firms to invest more 
capital at once in uncertain markets rather than in tranches, as is normally the practice in VC. 
The invested sum in total is also smaller than in an equivalent start-up in a steadier environ-
ment.296 
 
Firms investing in emerging markets must protect themselves in transactions more thor-
oughly since the remedies for misappropriation of invested funds or investments made on 
false pretences might be non-existent or too costly to be applicable.297 Most of the covering 
happens ex-ante through due diligence and good networks rather than ex-post through legal 
procedure. Although interestingly one of the most famous cases of abuse of power on the 
continent is the case of minority control abuse in Emerging Capital Partners, a US PE firm, 
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vs. Spencon, a Kenyan construction company. The foreign PE firm was allegedly able to 
take control of the entire Kenyan company through financial manoeuvring in the attempt to 
flip the company for a profitable exit, so the risk runs both ways.298 
 
Arbitration is often touted as the solution for investing in riskier markets where ex-post legal 
remedies are insufficient. Unfortunately, in the VC world of emerging markets investments 
are relatively small in comparison with the costs associated with solving the matter through 
arbitration299 and even when solved the collection of damages is unlikely. The damages need 
to be recouped from a start-up with most likely very limited financial means using the legal 
system which was circumvented by arbitration in the first place.300 
 
Another danger investors need to take into account in developing countries is the level of IP 
protection provided by the country of the start-up’s domicile and target markets. The glob-
alisation of business has required a unified approach to IP protection incentivizing countries; 
strong IP protection will bring business and investments and weak protection will scare mar-
ket actors away. As part of the due diligence process, the VC firm must analyse what kind 
of protection will be needed for the start-up’s outputs.  
 
Some start-ups, where the product is brand-based and physical, need strong legal protection. 
For example, a clothing or electronics company will have trouble cashing in on its success 
if the measures to stop counterfeit and copycat products are unavailing. Other types of busi-
nesses survive and thrive just on informal protection methods like keeping the “recipe”301 
secret or simply by utilizing the first movers’ advantage to keep the market.302 African coun-
tries have had very different approaches and levels of success thus IP protection will also be 
covered as part of the country profiles.303 
 
 
298 Barnwell Enterprises Ltd v. Emerging Capital Partners, Misc. No. 2016-2581 (D.D.C. 2017), cases in 
Uganda, Kenya and Mauritius still pending. 
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300 Myburgh and Paniagua 2016 
301 Or most likely in the case of start-ups the code. 
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Informal institutions, born out of a weak legal and political system, are tough to tackle when 
coming into a country as a foreign investor, especially when coming into an unfamiliar busi-
ness culture as would be the case for Finnish VC firms venturing to Africa. To navigate the 
world of informal institutions an investor needs a network of local assistance as already dis-
cussed in the paragraph on choosing the “vehicle” for investment. Informal institutions are 
gatekeepers to fluid business in the region. The difference in the practice of an informal 
institution and bribery or corruption might sometimes be hard to discern for a foreign inves-
tor again stressing the importance of good advisors knowledgeable in local ways of opera-
tion.304 
 
The final step in the journey of a cross-border VC investment is the exit. Cross-border exits 
differ on a theory level in a few ways from domestic ones. Firstly, the time to exit is longer 
than in domestic exits, at least in comparison with the golden standard of US VC.305 This 
longer time to exit in cross-border VC investments is due to factors such as level of legality 
and freedom of the economy.306Also in contrast with common belief, the local stock market 
does not affect the time to exit in cross-border VC investments although the legality is often 
tied to the quality of the local stock market.307 
 
To contrast the statistics that make cross-border investment exits a bit harder to achieve is 
the validity of the convergence hypothesis308. The convergence hypothesis for economic 
growth was found to be true in research on cross-border VC investments in developing coun-
tries thus supportive of the idea to venture out into developing countries for faster growth.309 
 
From a more practical standpoint, the same exit methods apply: IPO or one of the many 
equity deal methods. As discussed earlier, buyouts come most often from the current man-
agement, PE firms or companies within the industry of the start-up. In Africa generally exits 
are seen as one of the most significant challenges for start-ups. Currently, PE and other fi-
nancial buyers represent 54% of total exits and trade sales 31%.310 The impact of local law 
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308 Poorer countries will eventually catch up to richer countries, so their current growth is faster than that of 
more developed countries. In the research regarding cross-border VC investments GDP per capita is found to 
be negatively related to the likelihood and hazard of a successful exit. 
309 Wang and Wang 2012 




and customs on specific exit routes will be covered also country-by-country in the following 
chapter. 
 
As 85% of deals happen by the sale of equity in Africa, in most cases a VC firm will go 
through a process similar to the one of investing in a start-up by buying its shares. The spe-
cifics of the process depend on the type of purchaser and their domicile. As the share of 
foreign PE in Africa is large the purchases can become complicated international deals.311 
At this point, the local taxation, governmental incentives312 and the choice of investment 
vehicle play a role in determining how the exit is structured and what costs arise because of 
it.313 
 
In case the start-up fails, the local bankruptcy proceedings will come into play. The bank-
ruptcy process and the strength of it also play into the general level of legality that was 
mentioned earlier and into the way creditors are dealt with in general314. Creditor protection 
and bankruptcy law, in general, is not that strong in Africa with a lot of informal processes 
and because there are vast differences among the continent’s countries bankruptcy and cred-
itors will be covered in more depth in the following chapter.315 
 
As the chapter demonstrates there are no major differences in the actual process of cross-
border investment to Africa. The firm needs to find a target, do the due diligence, invest, 
actively manage and exit just like it would in the Nordics or Europe but the magnitude of 
difference in the familiar steps is what makes the proceedings challenging and that is what 
the rest of the thesis will delve into. Firstly, analysing by target country the framework for 
investment building on top of the differences in the process highlighted by this chapter and 
then looking at it through a lens of a Finnish VC firm through interviews. 
  
 
311 Babarinde 2012 
312 At this stage tax breaks mostly.  
313 Biekpe 2004 
314 For example, as a start-up with cashflow concerns, a refusal of payment by a customer can drive the start-
up financially into hot water especially when there is a lack of official routes to pursue the rightful payment. 











Nigeria has a tumultuous history. It was a British colony from 1852 receiving independence 
in 1960 sparking civil wars over control of the then dubbed “African Giant” because of the 
petroleum reserves found in 1958. Corruption and conflict have marred the development of 
the nation since.316 Corruption is seen as the largest obstacle preventing Nigeria to reach its 
full potential317 with its Corruption Perceptions Index rank stagnating in the bottom 25% 
globally since the beginning of the index in 1995.318  
 
Despite the challenges, Nigeria has grown into an economic behemoth of Africa. It has the 
largest GDP319 (€367bn320) and the highest population321 (206mil322) on the continent. A lot 
of its economic power stems from its abundant natural resources323. It is the world’s 8th larg-
est oil exporter with its economy heavily reliant on these exports: crude oil accounts for 10% 
of its GDP, 70% of the government’s revenue and 83% of the country’s export income. 
Services are the main employer (52%) and the main industry as a portion of the GDP (52%). 
The main subsectors for services in Nigeria are retail, telecommunications and the financial 
industry.324 The country’s stock market, founded in 1961, has 161 companies with a total 
market cap of €46bn.325 
 
Nigeria’s future outlook is a mix of unrealized potential and major challenges. Population 
growth and oil reserves fall into both categories. Nigeria’s population is expected to surpass 
the population of the US by 2050 with almost 400mil inhabitants. The rapid population 
growth is causing housing, food supply and employment not being able to meet the needs of 
 
316 Falola and Heaton 2008 
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the citizens.326 On the flip side Nigeria is estimated to be one of the few countries in the 
world by 2030 that will have its main demographic be young workers creating a strong hu-
man capital pool to build development on.327 The second challenge/opportunity, depending 
on the view, for Nigeria has been its heavy dependence on oil exports. The dependence 
makes fluctuations in oil prices have an inordinately effect on its economy but on the flip 
side if the inflowing capital from oil exports would be put to project creating sustainable 
growth for the country Nigeria could develop rapidly.328 All in all, the future of Nigeria could 
be bright with its enormous potential if the unfortunate political actions currently stymying 
growth are overcome. 
 
4.1.2 Legal Landscape for VC Investments 
 
As a former British colony, Nigeria has adopted a mixed legal system with a strong British 
influence. The four legal traditions fused to form Nigeria’s legal space are English law, 
Common law329, Customary law330 and Sharia law331.332 The government’s judicial branch 
exercises its power through federal courts with the Supreme Court of Nigeria being the high-
est court in the hierarchy.333 The GII ranks Nigeria’s regulatory quality and rule of law 122nd 
and 118th respectively out of the 131 countries measured.334 The realities of the strength of 
the legal landscape need to be mirrored with the information in this chapter; what is stated 
as the law might be poorly enforced or non-codified informal processes might supersede it.  
 
The acts that a Finnish VC firm would be most impacted by in Nigeria when investing in a 
start-up are the Companies and Allied Matters Act, the Nigerian Code of Corporate Govern-
ance, the Venture Capital (Incentives) Act and the Companies Income Tax Act. The fact that 
there is a specific act for incentivising VC speaks volumes for the potential Nigerian author-
ities see in attracting VC.335 The Act itself incentivizes VC investments through tax breaks 
at both ends of the investment: a tax credit is received for the full amount of the principal, 0 
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to 100% of profits arising from an equity exit are taxed depending on the time-to-exit336 and 
50% of dividends paid to VC funds from ventures are tax-free.337 
 
Sans incentives, the corporate tax rate is 30%338 and dividends are taxed at 10%339 in Nigeria. 
Finland has initialled a draft of a double-taxation agreement in 1990340 with Nigeria but it 
has never been ratified.341 Not having a tax treaty might seem unusual but in Nigeria’s case, 
this is more than likely. Nigeria has currently only thirteen342 active treaties.343 The lack of 
a treaty bilateral treaty between Finland and Nigeria adds a layer of cost because companies 
will have to either create a subsidiary in one of the countries with a treaty or pay the full 
withholding tax of 10%344. Having a strong network of DTTs and other treaties is a corner-
stone of a countries internationalization efforts so it is likely the network will expand with 
Nigeria’s development.345 
 
The structure and operation of potential target start-ups in Nigeria are governed by the Com-
panies and Allied Matters Act and the Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance. Both are 
relatively new, with the Companies and Allied Matters Act being revised in 2020 and the 
Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance being introduced in 2019. The CAMA is an 870 
section primary legislation governing the establishing and managing a business with the re-
cent revision being part of the governmental efforts to ease commerce in the country.  
 
From the point of view of a Finnish VC firm, the Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 
would be of more interest since it would be the playbook for active management and protect 
the firm against potential abuse by the target start-up’s other investors and directors. Before 
 
336 A five-year exit is not taxed, 25% gets taxed in a 6 to 10 years exit, 75% gets taxed in an 11 to 15 years 
exit and after that, the tax has to be paid in full. The system incentivizes a quick scale-up of start-ups which 
also ties in the VC firm more intensely because they are extra motivated to exit within five years since this 
makes the exit 43% more valuable (in comparison with an exit without the tax exemption for example in an-
other jurisdiction). 
337 Venture Capital (Incentives) Act 1993 
338 Section 40 Subsection 1 of the Companies Income Tax Act 2007 
339 Section 80 Subsection 2 of the Companies Income Tax Act 2007 
340 Henri Telkki 2014 (Finnwatch) 
341 Vero.fi 2021 ” Voimassa olevat verosopimukset” 
342 Belgium, Canada, China, Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Slo-
vakia, South Africa, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
343 PwC 2021 ”Nigeria: Corporate – Withholding taxes” 
344 In comparison with the 7,5% withholding rate which can be credited in most of the DTTs. 




establishing the NCCG Nigeria did not have a unified code of corporate governance.346 
Though it is still early to say as Nigerian corporations are transitioning to the new code but 
a well codified governance structure could make a real impact through the increase in trust 
in the Nigerian corporate world.347  
 
From the point of a Finnish VC firm, the code’s chapters on the relationship with sharehold-
ers, the board and assurance are especially important. The code outlines the need for equita-
ble treatment of shareholders, transparency of ownership348 and adequate protection of mi-
nority shareholders from abusive actions to govern the relationship of shareholders.349 The 
GII puts Nigeria at 27th globally in minority shareholder protection350 which is good news 
for VC firms although most VC firms take a more active position than exercising their rights 
at a general meeting as a minority shareholder. Most term sheets stipulate a board seat for 
the VC firm, so the dynamics of the board are important. A board in Nigeria is recommended 
to have a majority of Non-Executive Directors and that the majority of these directors to be 
independent351 adding confidence through the objectivity of the board.352 These independent 
non-executive directors are a typical mechanism in emerging markets to combat corrup-
tion.353  
 
The last line of defence for a Finnish VC firm are the procedures of assurance. A company 
should have a risk management framework that defines risk policy, appetite and limits and 
then monitors the day-to-day business practices in line with the set boundaries. This frame-
work goes through an internal audit at least quarterly and an external audit gives assurance 
to the entirety of the operation. For cases when rules are broken an anonymous whistle-
blower system needs to be in place for internal and external stakeholders.354 
 
 
346 Some industries had their own code of governance but for many industries the NCCG will be the first con-
tact with a code on corporate governance. 
347 George Etomi & Partners 2019 
348 Knowing the ultimate beneficiary owner of any stake above 5%. 
349 Part C Principle 23 of the Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 2018 
350 WIPO 2020 “Nigeria” 
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352 Principle 2 of the Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 2018 
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The Copyright Act governs IP related issues and it empowers the Nigerian Copyright Com-
mission to enforce and deal with infringement.355 Although copyright is automatic the Com-
mission advises Nigerian creators to register their works to enable better assistance from the 
Commission.356 The commission and the Nigerian government have made an effort in recent 
years to crack down on IP infringements but protection is still very weak.357 The Interna-
tional Property Rights Index of 2020 ranks Nigeria 123rd globally and 26th in Africa in IP 
protection.358 One of the main challenges in IP protection for Nigeria is the strength of de-
terrents. The Copyright Act sets out the punishments for infringements at 10,000 Naira359 
for individuals and 50,000 Naira360 for corporations.361 The punishments have not been ad-
justed for inflation since 2004 making them toothless leaving seizure of goods as the only 
valid method of sanction. The situation with IP protection confirms an earlier point made 
about start-ups needing a product or service that does not require IP protection to be suc-
cessful in the Nigerian market.362 
 
In Nigeria, the arena of bankruptcy and creditors is heavily populated by informal processes 
and misuse of power.363 Debts are a civil matter but public bodies overstepping their bound-
aries are not uncommon as in Economic and Financial Crime Commission vs Diamond Bank 
where debtors were imprisoned unlawfully to gain repayment of a debt. This creates a two-
way issue for VC firms investing in Nigerian start-ups; if the start-up is owed money infor-
mal processes might be the only way to retrieve capital since the official legal means are 
weak364 and if they owe money and are unable to pay the start-up can face unexpected actions 
from creditors. 
 
Just by looking at the legal landscape Nigeria does not look like an optimal target market 
but it is important to remember that most start-ups are tech-based and run lean operations 
that can be easily extracted into other jurisdictions and are generally able to avoid many of 
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the shortcomings of the legal system as the next chapter on the flourishing start-up scene 
will demonstrate.  
 
4.1.3 Start-up Scene 
 
The Nigerian start-up scene is driven by entrepreneurs filling gaps that the government or 
large corporation have neglected. Nigeria’s ecosystem has an active network of support and 
its sheer market size enables start-ups to have great revenue potential just in its domestic 
market.365 Strictly by investment Nigeria is the largest start-up market in Africa attracting 
$747million in VC in 2019 representing a 144% YoY growth. The number of deals also 
increased by 46% YoY.366 
 
As the chapter on the current level of investment pointed out, Nigeria is very strong in 
fintech. Fintech is one of the industries where entrepreneurs are filling gaps left by institu-
tions that have not been meeting the needs of society. In 2019 50,5% of African tech start-
up funding went to Nigeria and 62% of this funding went towards Fintech which means 
almost a third of African tech VC goes to Nigerian fintech start-ups.367 Edutech is another 
industry where start-ups are filling basic infrastructural gaps368 left by the government. Pri-
vate schooling is not seen as a prerogative of the well-off. Entrepreneurs are creating cost-
effective tech-based solutions for private schooling.369 The start-up uLesson370 is an embod-
iment of this: it offers remote education via an app, browser or SD card at an affordable 
price371. The start-up raised €6.32mil in Series A in January of 2021372. The investment came 
from a Silicon Valley based global leader in edutech VC Owl Ventures373. 
 
Though Nigeria has tech centres across the country Lagos has become the epicentre of the 
start-up ecosystem.374 Its population of 14 million makes it the 17th largest city in the 
world375 so it is the natural home for what is referred to as Yabacon Valley which has been 
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the epicentre for the Nigeria’s start-up world since its inception.376 Yabacon Valley boasts 
fast internet speeds and a cluster of hubs and incubators like the NG_Hub by Facebook377 
supporting the countless start-ups headquartered in the area.378 
 
Nigeria ranks 72nd globally in the Venture Capital and Private Equity Country Attractiveness 
Ranking of 2018. The ranking highlights the strengths of having a large internal market and 
favourable labour regulations. On top of the challenges related to the legal and infrastructural 
situation in Nigeria already mentioned in the thesis, an additional challenge is seen as a major 
blocker, the currency.379 The Naira has always been experiencing serious inflation380 adding 
costs for the firms and heightening the risk relating to the investment. Investments made in 
Nigeria need to beat the inflation and then generate a return on top of that for foreign VC 
firms since the VC firm needs to pay its own investors in its local currency.381 Foreign VC 
firms often invest in Dollars but that still does not protect382 from the revenue fluctuations.383 
So a start-up with a booming domestic business is less attractive even with Nigeria’s large 
internal market since its revenue will come in local currency which might devalue tens of 
percentage points a year in comparison to the Euro or Dollar. 
 
The future challenges for the Nigerian start-up space are, as the chapter points out, infra-
structural. Through better education, consistent and fair enforcement of the law, decreased 
corruption and stable fiscal policy Nigeria has a lot of room to grow. When the current chal-
lenges are mirrored with the current success of the start-ups it shows great resilience and 
ingenuity in the market;384 VC firms and start-ups are not just accepting the current situation 
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South Africa has a turbulent past plagued with colonial rule and internal conflict. The coun-
try gained its independence in 1934, after hundreds of years of first Dutch and then British 
rule. As with Nigeria, independence started a dark time in the country’s history of internal 
conflict.386 The years of apartheid created wounds through society that are healing to this 
day.387 In the years following the end of apartheid South Africa has managed to rebuild itself 
as the “Port to Africa”. International businesses wanting to enter the African market often 
choose South Africa as an entry point into the continent’s market.388 Uber expanding to 
South Africa and achieving its fastest growth globally is a great example of South Africa’s 
potential for African expansion.389 
 
The reasons South Africa is the country of choice when entering the African market, despite 
its GDP of €237bn390 being smaller than Nigeria’s and Egypt’s, are the diversity and sophis-
tication of its economy and the solid formal infrastructure backed by a sound legal system.391 
Out of South Africa’s 59 million392 inhabitants393, 72,3% are employed in services, 22,7% 
in industry and 5% in agriculture. The largest sub-industries are finance, real estate, business 
services and general government. As the sub-industries indicate, South Africa has a flour-
ishing financial market as demonstrated by its 133-year-old stock market with a total market 
capitalization of €1090bn.394 South Africa is one of the global leading producers and export-
ers of a number of natural resources395 with platinum in its various forms making up to 9,3% 
of its exports. 396 The African average employment by agriculture is 60% and 23% of GDP 
value creation.397 South Africa’s 5% employment and 1,9% of GDP value creation398 show-
case how South Africa’s economy has matured and diversified past its peers. 
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South Africa’s macroeconomic trends are worrying. The country’s debt-to-GDP ratio is ris-
ing but even more worrying is the fact that the ratio is rising because of the fall in GDP and 
not heavy borrowing which could be an indication of large infrastructural investments. The 
GDP per capita experienced a steep drop399 from 2011 to 2016 with some recovery towards 
2018 but 2019 was again lower.400 A few of the keys to South Africa returning to a path of 
growth: going up the value chain in mining, currently the country exports most of its re-
sources raw, and reaching higher levels of tech adoption.401 The country boasts a great in-
frastructure on which to build on; through the right governmental policy anything is possible. 
 
4.2.2 Legal Landscape for VC Investments 
 
The similarities with Nigeria continue in the legal realm. South Africa has a mixed legal 
system with primarily British common law influence. The South African legal system is built 
on Roman-Dutch civil law, British common law and African tribal customary law.402 The 
country’s highest court is the Constitutional Court which guards the constitution and protects 
everyone’s human rights. The structure below the Constitutional Court is hierarchical with 
the Supreme Court of Appeal being the highest court that decides non-constitutional matters. 
South Africa also has a number of specialized courts to deal with labour, special income 
taxation, divorce and land claims among many others.403 As mentioned in the overview, 
South Africa’s legal system is one of its attractions for foreign investors and businesses when 
choosing targets for expansion and the GII ratings confirm this. The GII ranks South Africa’s 
regulatory environment at 43rd and its rule of law 67th globally.404 
 
Legislation in South Africa is embodied in acts.405 The following acts will be touched on in 
this chapter because of their importance for VC investments in South Africa: the Companies 
Act, the King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa, the Income Tax Act, 
the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, the Trade Marks Act, the Copyright 
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Act, the Patents Act, the Designs Act, the South African Insolvency Act and the National 
Credit Act.  
 
Corporate Governance in South Africa very similar to that of other large economies. South 
Africa is part of G20 and has applied many of the best practices and has modelled its com-
pany law on that of Canada, Australia and New Zeeland.406 In South Africa VC investments 
are typically done using a company structure, not a limited partnership.407 When a company 
wants to start making VC investments in South Africa it needs authorisation from the Finan-
cial Advisory.408  
 
Corporate Governance in South Africa has recently gone through a revamp. Companies have 
replaced the “Apply or Explain” of 75 principles with a simpler “Apply and Explain” 17 
principle Governance structure. The code is voluntary and companies are given legroom in 
the way they apply these 17 principles but following the code is seen as the basis of sound 
governance.409 The principles are built to help the firm achieve: an ethical culture, good 
performance, effective control and legitimacy. The philosophy of the governance structure 
is based on the idea of integrated thinking.410  Integrated thinking is a relatively new way of 
approaching corporate governance in which all the different value streams that the business 
interacts with are taken into consideration.411 This showcases how up to date South African 
corporate governance is and that it should not be seen as a hindrance to investments.  
 
The GII highlights the ease of protecting minority shareholders, ranking it 13th globally as 
one of the strengths of South African innovation supporting infrastructure.412 Most of the 
protection comes from the Company Act. It sets pre-emptions rights for current owners (also 
protecting against dilution)413, establishes a takeover panel to ensure fair transactions414 and 
empowers minority shareholders to apply to the court for protection against harmful actions 
by the majority. 
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Like Nigeria, South Africa also has created tax incentives for VC investing. The investor is 
allowed to deduct the full amount invested from taxable income that year as long as the 
investment does not fall into any of the prohibited categories415.416 The corporate tax rate in 
South Africa is 28% and dividends are taxed at 20%. Unlike Nigeria, South Africa has an 
extensive417 DTT network. The tax treaty with Finland stipulates a withholding rate of 0% 
for royalties and interest and a 5% or 15% withholding rate on dividends depending on the 
amount of equity418 the receiver of dividends holds.419 
  
Intellectual property protection is governed by a number of acts420 divided by the target of 
protection and signed international conventions and treaties421.  South Africa ranks 45th glob-
ally and 3rd in Africa in IP protection.422 The protection has become stronger as South Africa 
has come under pressure from corporations to make its regulations stricter.423  
 
In South Africa, the system of debt recovery and bankruptcy is built on the principle of 
favouring creditors. The South African Insolvency Act and the National Credit Act govern 
the space.424 Relief for bankruptcy in South Africa comes in three forms: winding up, reor-
ganization and judicial management. Winding up is the most common method and it can be 
triggered by debtors or the company itself. Reorganization is rare, it is mostly used to sell 
the company and often requires all or most of the debt being with one actor. Judicial man-
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The legal landscape is part of the attraction for foreign investors and corporations to come 
to South Africa. The facts stated in this chapter fortified this initial impression that South 
Africa has a good legal foundation for VC investment426.427  
 
4.2.3 Start-up Scene 
 
The South African VC landscape mirrors the larger economy. It is heterogeneous with no 
industry having an over 14,2% share of total value or number of deals. Surprisingly, the 
largest industry by the value of deals in South Africa is food & beverage, followed closely 
by agriculture. By the number of deals the largest industries where business products & ser-
vices and fintech, number one and two respectively.428 Although food & beverage and agri-
culture are higher capital expense industries when their popularity in investment is mirrored 
with Finland, Europe or the US food & beverage or agriculture429 does not even make it into 
the top five. It could be deduced that in the way Finland has a speciality in games and Nigeria 
has fintech South Africa has a comparative advantage in food & beverage. An example of a 
food & beverage start-up is the health soda company PURA430 which received an undis-
closed Series A from Knife Capital431, a South African VC firm. The capital raised has 
helped the soda start-up reach 13 countries with one of them being the US.432 
 
The South African VC and start-up space has experienced a major shift and expansion in the 
last ten years. In 2013 81% of entrepreneurs expressed that lack of funding in the early stages 
was their biggest blocker to success.433 As the space has matured, this has been ratified with 
53,8% of active deals in 2019 are early or seed stage. A lot of the new funds in South Africa 
are CVC, like seen in the US, and also from governmental programmes.434 
 
In 2019 South African start-ups attracted €172mil in investments making it the country with 
fourth most invested capital on the continent. In the number of rounds South Africa was 
 
426 The research for this chapter was considerably easier than for the one on Nigeria. Laws are codified 
clearly and there is generally more information, a lot of it encouraging, on the legal landscape of South Af-
rica. 
427 See Lemma 2015 
428 SAVCA 2020 ”Venture Capital Industry Survey” 
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number one accounting for 26% of deals made in Africa. Back in 2017, South Africa was 
number one also in funding but its small decline in investments combined with Nigeria’s 
and Kenya’s explosive growth has dethroned it as the start-up capital of Africa.435 
 
South Africa ranks 36th globally in the Venture Capital and Private Equity Country Attrac-
tiveness Ranking of 2018.  South Africa ranked highest out of all African countries because 
of its structural similarities in law with the UK, its strong financial market infrastructure and 
sound corporate governance practices.436 Johannesburg with its 5,8mil inhabitants accounted 
for 44,3% of deals in South Africa. The 4,6mil inhabitant port city of Cape Town is another 
major start-up hub.437 Cape Town is seen more as the tech hub and Johannesburg, as the 
capital, is seen as the centre for big business. VC firms are stationed in Johannesburg but the 
target start-ups, founders and developers being in Cape Town.438 Cape Town currently has 
450 to 550 active start-ups employing 40,000 people and a strong support network of incu-
bators and hubs.439 
 
All the chapters diving deeper into South Africa have uncovered a sturdy base on top which 
start-ups and VCs alike can build upon. Although the larger trends in South African are 
disconcerting with deal value dropping and the larger economy being in a downward trend 






Similarly to both Nigeria and South Africa, Kenya was under British rule. Kenya negotiated 
its independence last out of the three in 1963.440 The post-independence era was dominated 
by a political party of single tribe until 2002. The assets held by the British were not returned 
to their original owners but kept with the ruling party sparking internal conflicts that esca-
lated into tribal violence.441 Though there are still major tribal divisions, in the years follow-
ing the fall of the one-party-rule, Kenya has turned the tides and undergone a number of 
 
435 Partech Partners 2020 
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438 See Jackson 2018 (Disrupt Africa) 
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political, structural and economic reforms which have turned it into one of the fastest-grow-
ing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa.442 
 
Kenya has what is considered more of a traditional African economy in comparison with 
Nigeria and South Africa.443 Its total GDP of €85bn makes it the sixth-largest economy on 
the continent.444 Kenya’s population445 of 54mil446 is relatively evenly spread across agri-
culture and services with industry being a low 16,1% of GDP and 6% of the workforce. 
Agriculture is 34,1% of Kenyan GDP and it employs 53,8% of the workforce. Kenya is the 
third-largest producer and the largest exporter in volume of tea. Tea accounts for 19,1% of 
its exports. Other major commodities Kenya exports are flowers, coffee, fruits and poten-
tially in the future oil and gas with a potential for 750mil barrels447. The service sector is 
43,2% of GDP and employs 38,7% of the workforce with tourism, IT and communications 
being the major sub-industries. Kenya’s general economic sophistication and readiness to 
support innovation is what makes it a regional hub for business. Kenya was the first country 
that sold governmental bonds through mobile phones448 and the domestic stock exchange 
with a €19bn market cap has been a driver in developing and establishing mobile trading for 
the rest of Africa.449  
 
Kenya seems to have the most positive future outlook out of the three countries covered. Its 
GDP growth of 5,7% in 2019 was one of the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa.450 The future 
growth looks even brighter, in 2021 Kenya is expected to become the fastest-growing econ-
omy in Africa with a 6,9% GDP increase.451 The growth is a result of the “the Big 4” plan 
which focuses the efforts of the country on four key pillars for the next five years: enhancing 
manufacturing, food security and nutrition, universal healthcare coverage and affordable 
 
442 World Bank 2020 “The World Bank In Kenya” 
443 See Dercon and Gollin 2014 
444 Statista 2021 “African countries with the highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2020” 
445 7th largest in Africa. 
446 Statista 2021 ”African countries with the largest population as of 2021” 
447 To put it in context Romania, Italy and Denmark have 600mil barrels and Nigeria’s reserves are 50x of 
what Kenya potentially has in reserves so it is a relatively small amount that will not majorly impact Kenya’s 
economic prospects.  
448 Societe Generale 2021 ”Kenya: The Market” 
449 Nairobi Security Exchange 2021 
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housing.452 If the set-out plan reaches its goals453 Kenya will become a major powerhouse 
on the continent and work its way towards the governmental vision dubbed “Kenya 2030” 
to become “a globally competitive and prosperous country with a high quality of life by 
2030”.454 Getting in early and gaining experience and share in the market might become very 
valuable in the future if the momentum keeps up. 
 
4.3.2 Legal Landscape for VC Investments 
 
Kenya also falls into the basket of a mixed legal system. The ideological pillars of Kenyan 
law are English common law, Sharia law and Tribal law.455 Reaching the current point in 
Kenya’s legal landscape has not been a smooth journey456 with the country’s constitution 
amended over 30 times since independence.457 The most recent amendment in 2010 has fi-
nally addressed the core issue of governmental power being abused458 although it did not 
enhance governmental accountability.459 The recent amendments have been major drivers in 
Kenya’s rapid development.460  
 
Kenya’s Supreme Court has the final ruling power in Kenya’s judicial branch. Below it in 
hierarchy exercising the doctrine of precedent follow the Court of Appeal, the High Court, 
the Magistrate’s Courts as well as specialized courts and tribunals.461 Kenya is ranked by 
GII 88th globally in rule of law and 89th in regulatory quality462 placing it somewhere in 
between South Africa’s sound legal structures and Nigeria’s weak but developing system. 
 
The regulation of the Kenyan VC space specifically is still in a nascent stage. It is policed 
by the Capital Markets Authority463 which in an effort to develop the regulation has drafted 
 
452 Kenyatta 2021 ”The Big Four” 
453 Within five years: 15% of GDP from manufacturing sector, 500,000 affordable houses to Kenyan fami-
lies, 100% universal health care coverage, 100% food and nutrition security. 
454 Kenya Vision 2030 
455 Daniels et al. 2011 
456 Joireman 2006 
457 Federal Research Division 2007 
458 The constitutional power given to the government are remnants from the colonisation when the British 
elected local leaders who ruled like dictators over their areas and from the almost 40-year one-party-rule 
which needed constitutional backing to stay in power. 
459 Akech 2011 
460 See Khaunya et al. 2015 
461 Kenya Law 2021 ”What is Law Reporting?” 
462 WIPO 2020 ”Kenya” 




a new comprehensive legal framework with various VC stakeholders to support the devel-
opment of Kenya’s VC and thus the start-up market.  This new legislation is currently going 
through the process of being enacted.464 The current framework for VC firms in Kenya is 
governed mostly by the following acts: the Capital Markets Act, the Finance Act, the Tax 
Laws (Amendment) Act, the Income Tax Act, the Companies Act, the Industrial Property 
Act, the Export Processing Zones Act and the Insolvency Act. 
 
The Capital Markets Act is the major regulator of VC in Kenya. The Capital Markets Act 
was recently amended by the Finance Act. Now any VC firm operating in Kenya needs to 
be licensed and approved by the Capital Markets Authority if they have access to public 
funds465.466 In cases of no public funds, the Capital Market Authority has an optional regis-
tration process for the firm to become a registered venture capital company467 which has 
unsurprisingly led to a situation where there are zero468 registered venture capital companies 
in Kenya.469 The registered VC firms would follow the Capital Markets (Registered Venture 
Capital Companies) Regulations which also set out the process and requirements of regis-
tration.470  
 
Though Kenya does not have a standardized code for corporate governance for non-public 
companies’ minority investors can be confident in their protection against majority abuse. 
The GII ranks Kenya’s ease of protecting minority shareholders number one globally.471 
This incredible achievement was built through expanding and strengthening disclosure re-
quirements, adding regulatory approval to transactions, increasing available remedies for 
when transactions are prejudicial, increasing shareholders’ rights and role in major corporate 
decisions and greater corporate transparency.472 As a concrete example, the renewed Com-
panies Act enables any member of the company the locus standi to take the company to court 
 
464 Marone 2019 
465 A lot of Finnish VC firms have public investors in their funds so this is a step that firms would need to 
complete. 
466 Section 30 of the Finance Act No. 8 of 2020 
467 “A company approved by the Authority and incorporated for purposes of providing risk capital to small  
and medium-sized businesses in Kenya with high growth potential, whereby not less than seventy-five per 
cent of the funds so invested consist of equity or quasi-equity investment in eligible enterprises;” Section 2 of 
the Capital Markets Act Chapter 485A Revised Edition 2012 
468 CMA 2021 
469 Section 11 Subsection 3(f) of the Capital Markets Act Chapter 485A Revised Edition 2012 
470 Sections 3-7 of the Capital Markets (Registered Venture Capital Companies) Regulations 2007 
471 WIPO 2020 ”Kenya” 




if oppressive conduct or unfair prejudice has transpired.473 In blatant cases of criminal abuse 
and fraudulent activity, the Companies Act lays down steep474 penalties.475  
 
On the base level, Kenya’s corporate tax is 30% for resident companies (also foreign sub-
sidiaries count) and 37,5% for branches of foreign companies.476 To stimulate investment 
Kenya has what is referred to as the Export Processing Zones Program. It is a perfect fit for 
a VC firm as an investing entity or part of a target start-up.477 A firm that fits the criteria for 
the EPZ Program and receives a license enjoys 10 years of no corporate tax or withholding 
tax after which a 25% tax rate for the next ten years is after which levied the normal 30% 
rate becomes applicable.478 There are also other benefits of joining the program like rapid 
project approvals, inexpensive facilities built for participants in the program and many oth-
ers479 to enable growth and new exports for Kenya. To be eligible for these benefits the firm 
needs to be incorporated in Kenya, undertake activities480 that are eligible for EPZ, not have 
a “deleterious” impact on the environment and conduct business in accordance with the laws 
bar any exemptions given.481 Looking at Kenya’s DTT network it is closer to Nigeria than 
South Africa. It currently has 17 DTTs but does not have one in place with Finland and the 
sans a DTT withholding rate is 15%.482 
 
Kenya ranks 86th globally and 10th in Africa in IP protection.483 In the new 2010 constitution, 
IP has been prioritized and transformed by making it compliant with TRIPS. With its con-
stitutional status, it is now the base of legal frameworks and policy affecting businesses. 
These significant changes are taking time to reverberate across the business world with one 
of the key challenges the Kenyan Industrial Property Institute484 faces being the promotion 
 
473 Section 780 of the Companies Act No. 17 of 2015 
474 Fines of up to 8000€, disqualification from practice for up to 15 years and imprisonment up to 7 years. 
475 Section 818 of the Companies Act No. 17 of 2015 
476 Head B Section 1 of the Income Tax Act Chapter 470 Revised Edition 2012 
477 Export Processing Zones Authority Kenya 2021 
478 Eleventh Schedule Section 1 of the Income Tax Act Chapter 470 Revised Edition 2012 
479 100% investment deduction on new investment, Perpetual exemption from payment of stamp duty on le-
gal instruments, Perpetual exemption from VAT and customs import duty on inputs, Operation under essen-
tially one license issued by EPZA, No Exchange Controls – liberalized foreign exchange regime, Onsite cus-
toms documentation and inspection by Customs Staff, Unrestricted investment by foreigners, One-Stop-Shop 
service for facilitation and aftercare. 
480 Focuses on horticulture/food processing, textile/apparel, leather, commercial crafts, BPO or ICT sector. 
481 Section 23 of the Export Processing Zones Act Revised Edition 2012 
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of greater public understanding of IP rights and their utilization.485 But already at its current 
level, the share of IP receipts of total trade is ranked 25th globally by the GII.486 
 
The Insolvency Act is the main legislation for bankruptcy and creditors in Kenya. It has 
taken a different approach from the Company Acts provisions which have previously steered 
the insolvency process. The Insolvency Act is built on the principle of trying to through 
administration restructure and give a new lease on life to the company instead of straight 
liquidation.487 The case St. Mark Freight Services Limited v Sarah Wangui & Another show-
cases the debt collection and enforcement by the courts when foreign companies are dealing 
in Kenya. The process is arduous and built on the for-commission debt recovery industry but 
still far from the informal processes mentioned in the chapter on Nigeria.  
 
As mentioned a few times during this chapter the legal landscape’s support for VC and busi-
ness in general seems to fall in between Nigeria and South Africa with clear governmental 
efforts to drive change that have maybe not yet been reflected in the market to the levels that 
they were intended. 
 
4.3.3 Start-up Scene 
 
Referred to as the “Silicon Savannah” Kenya’s tech start-up space has, similarly to the larger 
economy, experienced quite a transformation in the last decade.488 Its militating factors out-
weighed the potential of the country for investors since its independence.489 This started 
changing after 2010 with VC endeavours popping up in Kenya creating profitable exits, jobs 
and tax revenue.490 Currently, Kenya has the second largest start-up market in Africa. It 
received start-up funding of €472mil and 52 deals were made with funding growing 62% 
YoY and the number of transactions 18%.491 The main drivers in transforming the Kenyan 
start-up space were the availability of affordable ICT equipment and the development of the 
internet and telecommunication industry in the country492.493  
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The start-up space is heavily focused on Nairobi.494 With a population of 4,5mil, it is the 
home to a talented workforce large tech companies495, incubators, co-working spaces and 
accelerators. Investors in Kenya seek “frugal innovation” to meet the markets’ needs; ideas 
that grow exponentially at a low marginal cost and leverage tech to do this.496 The main 
industries for start-ups in Kenya are renewable energy, agritech and logistics.497 M-Pesa laid 
the groundwork for these industries to thrive by enabling mobile payments.498 
 
Twiga Foods is a great example of a start-up that plays into both the agritech and logistics 
industries and is built on the mobile payment infrastructure. It is a transparent and cashless 
marketplace platform and delivery service enabling farmers to sell their harvests to retailers 
without taking on the challenges of logistics and sales negotiations. Twiga Foods has raised 
€90mil to date and is currently taking on African expansion.499 Another high-profile Kenyan 
start-up is M-Kopa. It offers mobile-based energy solutions to low-income customers ena-
bling them to pay off solar solutions in instalments building a credit record enabling further 
financial health. M-Kopa has raised €156mil from all over the world and has enabled over 
1mil people to access solar lighting and other energy-efficient products.500 
 
Kenya ranks 53rd globally in the Venture Capital and Private Equity Country Attractive-
ness Ranking of 2018. Kenya is also the country that has the largest change in the attrac-
tiveness ranking from 2014 to 2018. Kenya improved its standing by 37 places which is a 
testament to something that has been repeated already many times during this chapter: the 
post-2010 Kenya is developing at a rapid pace.501 
 
Something that concretizes the ambition of the Kenyan start-up space for the future is the 
€12,4bn governmental project of Konza Technopolis. When completed in 2030502, it is going 
to be a 20 square km technology hub city, between Nairobi and the port town of Mombasa.503 
It is a project suitable in zeal to match the growth of the market.  
 
494 See Rosenberg and Brent 2020 
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There are two types of obstacles for Finnish VC firms to invest in Africa: firstly, the obsta-
cles that are perceived by the people making investment decisions and secondly, the actual 
obstacles that would stop an investment process. The difference between these two groups 
is determined by the time spent researching the subject matter. The more informed, the less 
assumption based the obstacles become. As the assumption-based obstacles hold within 
themselves the research-based obstacles the best way to gather the information is a qualita-
tive interview but as part of the interview trying to determine has research gone into these 
assumptions.  
 
The main goal was to interview every single active Finnish VC firm. The answer base was 
already small, so every interview was valuable. Out of the 35 firms classified as VC firms 
in the FVCA member list 26 fit the criteria of being still active and being Finnish504. To 
achieve the goal of getting an answer from every single firm a few aspects in interview 
quality had to be compromised on.  These compromises might affect the results but they 
were a trade-off for getting maximum data on the market: the method of interviewing, the 
language used and the differences in the firms. All the answerers were assured of anonymity 
to get the most honest answers and to not be wary when talking about the strategy the par-
ticular firm deploys when seeking out investment targets505. 
  
The method of answer collection was two-tiered. The first attempt to get answers was by 
phone. If that failed, a request for a call followed by a text message or email. If the request 
for an interview was not answered the questions were emailed which led to an answer in all 
cases506. The people chosen as targets for the interviews held senior positions507 in the firms 
so that the answers would come from a point of authority and experience. 69% of the inter-
views were conducted over the phone. The remaining 31% over email because of the failure 
 
504 Non-Finnish VC firms are members of the Association. 
505 A concern that was raised a few times during the calls before I was able to mention the anonymity of the 
interview. 
506 After attempting a few different people within the organization. 




to get someone from the firm on a phone. As it was expected that some of the interviews 
would be conducted via email this was reflected in the creation of the questions. The ques-
tions were made simple and very straight forward to maximize the cross-platform answer 
comparability. This led to no major difference in the quality of answers from the point of the 
thesis.  
 
Another factor that might have affected the answers was that the interviews were conducted 
in two different languages. Some interviews were in Finnish and some in English and at the 
point of translation an answer could be interpreted wrongly. Although the writer of the thesis 
had at the point of interviews been immersed in the thesis already for months so the basic 
parlance of the VC world in both languages was at a level that was good enough to make the 
choice to accommodate the language preferences of the interviewee.  
 
Finally, the heterogeneity of VC firms in Finland affected the answers given. There are two 
metrics that differentiate VC firms in Finland. The first one is the stage at which they invest. 
The earlier the VC firms invest the less capital it deploys and the more involved they are 
generally. This in turn might affect what is seen as an obstacle when venturing to Africa.508 
The second metric is industry focus. Being a generalist or a specialized fund brings with it 
its own challenges. As earlier mentioned, a specialized fund might be more ready to venture 
out of the Nordics because of the niche space they are inhabiting in comparison with a gen-
eralist that is able to get enough deal flow in a considerably smaller market.  In an ideal 
situation the answers could be divided by type of VC firm but with just 26 potential interview 
targets further subcategorizing them would diminish the value of the interview data.  
 
As preparation for the interviews data was gathered from all the firms’ websites to have a 
base understanding of the firm during the interview to better understand the answers to the 
questions that would be asked. Also, the base research provided a further overview of the 
Finnish VC space. The specialization, size and geographic focus of the firms were gathered 
before the interviews. The data gathered helped formulate the questions to figure out what 
was needed for the thesis that was not publicly available and it also helped in building a 
rapport with the interviewee. 
 
 




To assure a high response rate and easy comparability through thematic analysis three ques-
tions were chosen for the interview. Having just three questions enabled the possibility to 
get answers within one to two minutes during a call and gather the bare-bones data if the 
interviewee was tight on time but the open-endedness enabled also a longer discussion. This 
seemed to work as the calls ranged from 90 seconds to 15-minute discussions depending on 
the firm. The first question asked was “Why do you have a geographic focus on invest-
ments?”509. The second question asked was “Have you ever thought of investing in Af-
rica?”510. And the third question was “Why did you answer Yes/No to the previous ques-
tion?”511.  
 
The first question was to confirm the data gathered from the initial research on the firms’ 
websites and to give reasons why there is a geographic focus in the first place. The answers 
to the questions did not just provide data for gathering the obstacles but also gave insight 
into the different VC strategies and ways of attacking the market. 
 
The second question was instructed to be answered in a simple binary yes or no to have a 
clear percentage of how many firms have even though of Africa as an investment. This ques-
tion was also the earlier mentioned way of measuring the level of assumptions in the answers. 
Though a binary answer provides a clear quantifiable data point the weakness is that there 
might be different definitions for “thinking of investing“ but based on the longer discussions 
“thinking of investing” was considered a synonym for research in the area. 
 
The third question is the meat and potatoes of the interview. It encourages the VCs to list 
reasons why they are not thinking of investing in Africa or why they are thinking of investing 
in Africa. As only one hybrid Finnish-African investment has been made, as mentioned ear-
lier in the chapter on Finnish VC activity in Africa, all the answers were on why they are not 
investing in Africa. The point was to get concrete obstacles but also have answers to mirror 
with the first question.  
 
The most important goal that was set out for the interviews was achieved. The thesis has a 
100% response rate from the applicable 26 firms chosen for interviews. As the first and third 
 
509 In Finnish: ”Miksi teillä on maantieteellinen rajaus sijoituksissa?” 
510 In Finnish: ”Oletteko koskaan harkinneet Afrikkaan sijoittamista?” 




questions were left open-ended the responses varied in length and depth. All the answers 
seemed to be in line with earlier research on the firms and gave very valuable insight into 
the inner workings of the firms. For the writer of the thesis, it was a pleasure to have all these 
conversations, however short, and the wide range of thoughts and points of view were very 
helpful with the end goal of the thesis in mind. The following chapter will break down the 
results gathered. 
 
5.2 The Results 
 
5.2.1 Question I 
 
The first question was “Why do you have a geographic focus on investments?”. The inter-
viewees gave a total of 41 reasons.512  The answers were grouped into 8 reasons to make the 
data clearer. A few examples of how thematic analysis was performed: “investors have de-
cided into what geographies they want their money invested” was categorized as “mandate”, 
“we feel we know our Nordic environment well” was categorized as “local expertise” or 
“our style of VC investing is a contact sport” into “being geographically close to founders”. 
As the examples demonstrate, assumptions were made whilst grouping the reasons but they 
were kept at a reasonable level. Also, firm-specific information that would unveil the firm 
giving the answer was removed.  
 
After the necessary grouping five main reasons emerged: mandate, being geographically 
close to founders, networks, local expertise and lack of resources. Logically, the number one 
reason for geographic focus was mandates. 40% of interviewees mentioned it as one of the 
reasons. A surprising513 second was being geographically close to founders at 36% of inter-
viewees mentioning it. The third most mentioned reason at 24% was networks. This means 
networks for the investment stage (sourcing) but also for the business development stage 
when looking for potential partners for example. The fourth place was divided at 20% of 
interviewees mentioning local expertise and lack of funds. Lack of funds referring to the 
additional costs associated with international sourcing and the higher premiums in more con-
densed markets like the US.  
 
 
512 See Appendix B Q1 for the breakdown of the reasons. 




5.2.2 Question II 
 
The second question was a simple binary “Have you ever thought of investing in Africa?”. 
Out of the 26 firms asked 6 answered affirmatively making the total percentage of firms that 
have thought of investing in Africa 23%. As mentioned earlier, this question was posed to 
have a sense of the level of assumptions made in expressing the blockers. 23% is a low 
number although as the thesis has pointed out the African VC market is in a nascent stage 
and the whole idea of the thesis is to examine how Finnish VC firms could join the first 
movers venturing to Africa. However, the 23% still weighs the obstacles more towards the 
assumption category.   
 
5.2.3 Question III 
 
The third question "Why did you answer Yes/No to the previous question?”. As 77% an-
swered “no” to the second question there was no shortage of potential obstacles. A total of 
53 obstacles514 were given by interviewees. In a similar manner to the first question, the 
obstacles were grouped into 11 reasons to maximize the usability of the answers. Four ob-
stacles stood out of the answers: lack of local expertise, being geographically far from found-
ers, corporate governance and lack of network. Understandably, the blocker of lack of local 
expertise was mentioned by 40% of VC firms. It was followed by being geographically far 
from founders at 32%. The third place was a tie between a lack of networks and corporate 
governance with both being given by the 24% of the interviewees.  
 
5.2.4 The Obstacles for Analysis 
 
Instead of just taking the four most mentioned obstacles in QIII, it is important to look at the 
dataset as a whole. QI determines the firms’ possibilities and attitudes towards investing 
across borders, so the answers are impactful too. Not taking QI reasons into consideration 
would lead to just addressing the theoretical reasons why no companies are investing in Af-
rica but ignore the concrete ones why firms have drawn a line up to where they are willing 
to invest. The importance of QI is also heightened because Africa seems to be outside most 
of these lines.  
 
 




When looking at the data from QI and QIII there is a certain amount of overlap and four 
reasons stood out to the extent that they are undoubtedly the ones that need to be addressed. 
The four obstacles that the thesis will analyse for a solution in the final chapter are: corporate 
governance & unknown risks, local expertise & networks, being geographically far from 
founders and mandates.  
 
Corporate governance was combined with unknown risks for a few reasons. Corporate gov-
ernance expresses the challenges firms might face actively invested in the start-up and deal-
ing with the entrepreneur. Unknown risks, as aptly put in one interview, are “the fear of not 
knowing what we don’t know when investing in Africa”. These unknown risks work into 
corporate governance since it is the mechanism to minimize the uncertainty when dealing 
with a start-up. Combined corporate governance & unknown risk were mentioned by 40% 
of people in QIII and 8% in QI.  
 
Local expertise and networks were also combined since they supplement each other. Having 
networks gives you knowledge and having knowledge of the local market means having 
networks. They are hard to come by themselves. This obstacle is numerically the most men-
tioned with a combined 44% in QI and 64% in QIII.  
 
Being geographically far from founders is quite self-explanatory. A big part of VC investing 
is relationships515 and managing those relationships face to face is something VC firms seem 
to prefer. Also geographically far might actually refer to culturally far516 which will be 
touched on too in the analysis on this obstacle. It was mentioned by 36% in QI and 32% in 
QIII. 
 
Mandates arose as a reason in QI by 40% of the interviewees and 20% in QIII. As mandates 
are the gatekeeper to the capital within the fund it is important to analyse them even though 
they were not one of the main obstacles arising in QIII. Looking at how and why they are 
negotiated and what are the typical provisions in them might give insight into why emerging 
markets seem to be left out in many cases.  
 
 
515 Turcan 2008 and also based on interviews held for the thesis. Came up countless times, especially when 
discussing the blocker of being far from founders.  








After the interviews with Finnish VC firms, the four obstacles seen as the main blockers 
need to be countered with solutions. To propose solutions to these obstacles based on a re-
view of academic output and local legislation (de lege lata) is not enough for a few reasons. 
The main reason being that the obstacles are quite abstract and complex. They do not point 
towards a clear solution like for example an obstacle: “Kenya’s taxation is not VC friendly” 
would. Another reason is the fact that the thesis is dealing with an emerging trend and the 
academic research output into the field has not yet caught up so the material based on which 
the analysis would be built is lacking. Another additional source of knowledge is needed to 
create actual valuable solutions and the obvious choice are people dealing with the African 
VC and start-up space. This led to the choice of conducting a round of interviews to obtain 
insight from these market participators on how to approach these four obstacles and what 
solutions they would deploy to overcome them. 
 
To get an experienced point of view on the blockers eight interviews were conducted with 
four different points of view that are immersed into the African start-up scene: African VC 
and investment firms, International VC firms that invest in Africa, the African Venture Cap-
ital Association and FinnFund. Getting different points of view and ideas to overcome the 
obstacles is especially important since there is no Finnish VC firm currently investing in 
Africa that could offer a set process that would be proven to work.  
 
The first point of view came from African firms that know the local market, culture and are 
able to offer solutions that are currently in use and see the obstacles from the point-of-view 
of the local start-up. The people interviewed were Khaled Jilani a Senior Partner at Africin-
vest517, Tito Cookey-Gam a Senior Analyst at Echo VC518, Eric Osiakwan a Managing Part-
ner at Chanzo Capital519 and Funmi Makinwa a Compliance Manager at CcHub Nigeria520. 
 
517 A firm founded in 1994 with 18 funds and over €1,44bn raised.  
518 A Nigerian VC firm with companies operating in 12 countries across the world with €35mil deployed. 
519 A Ghanian VC firm investing in high-tech start-ups in Africa with €20mil deployed. 
520 A pre-incubation space and lab in ”Yabacon Valley” in Nigeria. It also has a fund of €2mil and has helped 




All these interviews were very insightful and offered concrete solutions to the obstacles as 
well as giving cultural context. 
 
Two interviews were conducted with representatives of international VC firms. Hans Osna-
brugge a Partner at Brooklyn Ventures521 and Dustyn Winder a Founder and Managing Part-
ner at Akili Ventures522 gave interesting insights on venturing into the African start-up mar-
ket while not being a local and the solutions they have utilized to thrive on the continent. 
 
Vasiliki Ntina a Research Associate at AVCA was able to give big picture information, how 
the space has changed over the years, where to focus additional research and what the current 
trends are and also confirming the basis for the thesis that Africa is experiencing a wave of 
investment.  
 
The interview with FinnFund’s Investment Manager Johanna Raehalme was central in un-
derstanding the blockers from the point-of-view of someone who invests in Africa from Fin-
land since, as mentioned earlier, FinnFund is the closest entity to a Finnish VC firm investing 
in Africa. The interview with Johanna Raehalme was scheduled last so also some of the 
solutions brought forth by the other interviewees could be dissected from the point of a Finn-
ish investor. 
 
The interviews were conducted over Zoom by video call because of the pandemic and geo-
graphic distance of most of the interviewees. All of the interviews had a similar process with 
the interviewee first listening to a summary of the thesis and how the obstacles were gathered 
and chosen. This was followed by a free discussion on each of the four obstacles with the 
ask that they try to think of ways to counter them by disproving or giving solutions.  
 
The following chapter will cover one by one the four chosen obstacles and the information 
gathered from the interviews will be used to steer and find applicable research for solutions 
and to back these solutions up.  
 
 
521 A Dutch-based VC firm with a lot of activity in Africa and an especially active investor attitude which 
was perfect for getting insights for the thesis. 








Every VC firm has a mandate for all of its funds. The mandate agreement sets the parameters 
for the investment activity of the fund. Typically, limitations are set for the geography, stage 
or sector of the start-ups the fund can target.523 These limitations are a way for investors 
(limited partners) to align their objectives524 with the VC firm’s actions.525 During the inter-
views with Finnish VC firms, mandates were mentioned in QI526 by 40% of interviewees 
and by 20% in QIII527. At first glance, mandates are an obstacle that is hard to overcome 
since it is so set in stone and it is created not just by the VC firm but investors (limited 
partners) play a key role in setting a mandate too. The chain does not end there either; the 
limited partner typically528 has its own investors bringing another mandate into the picture. 
This chain of actors makes the obstacle more complex than just changing a VC fund’s man-
date to include Africa.  
 
As chapter 2.3.2 on the current state of Finnish VC pointed out Finland has gone through a 
major structural revamp with direct investments by public bodies subsiding and the private 
VC fund industry taking the lead. The public money has moved from the frontlines into 
funding the VC firms doing the investing.529 Business Finland has invested in 13 Finnish 
VC funds. The share of private capital530 in these funds is 51%531.532 Another source of pub-
lic capital in some Finnish VC funds is the European Investment Fund.533 The requirements 
tied to public investor capital were raised as a main driver in the mandate obstacle.534  
 
 
523 Ford and Nelsen 2014 
524 Risk tolerance and return expectations for example. 
525 FCLT Global 2020 
526 “Why do you have a geographic focus on investments?” 
527 "Why did you answer Yes/No to the previous question?” (The previous question: “Have you ever thought 
of investing in Africa?”) 
528 Unless a private person is investing. 
529 Ministry of Employment and the Economy 2014 
530 As Business Finland states ”Our investment is considerable in relation to the total size of a fund, however 
it does not exceed 50 per cent of total commitments.”  
531 €94mil out of €184mil 
532 Business Finland 2021 ”Venture Capital Investments” 
533 EIB and EIF 2019 and the fact that EIF has invested came up during the interviews with Finnish VC 
firms. 




Funds with capital from EIF are required to have 85%535 of investments within the EU.536 
When it comes to capital raised from Business Finland, which seems to be prevalent in the 
Finnish VC space, a major change has occurred in geographic mandate requirements and it 
is good news from the point of the thesis. Up to 2019 if Business Finland invested in a fund 
the fund was allowed to invest a maximum of 15% of its raised capital abroad. In 2019 the 
number changed to 40% and most recently in December of 2020 to 50%. The change was 
made to encourage more specialized Finnish VC funds, which are as research has pointed 
out are more profitable537. Since Finland’s internal market is not large enough to facilitate 
specialized firms that would invest 85% of their funds in Finland the geographic requirement 
had to be loosened.538 This means that funds set up from December 2020 onwards will be 
much more geographically mobile and incentivised to research deal flow outside Finland or 
the Nordics. 
 
When discussing the mandate obstacle with the interviewees with experience in the African 
market they found it understandable because of the risks tied to the continent539 and had 
come across the same challenges when seeking more global VC partners for their portfolio 
companies expanding outside the domestic market.540 Although, the interviewees have no-
ticed positive development in mandates in the VC world recently, like the example with 
Business Finland, to accommodate more geographically diverse investing.541 African start-
ups have also adapted to the mandate challenge and many of them seeking more international 
funding incorporate in the US or Europe to be reachable within the parameters set in geo-
graphically fixed mandates.542 
 
When looking at the obstacle again with the new information on how Business Finland is 
now approaching mandates and how African firms are incorporating in Europe and the US 
the only challenge left is demystifying Africa as an investment target so that it becomes 
 
535 Does not specify if by amount or value. 
536 EIB and EIF 2019 
537 Gompers et al. 2009 
538 Interview with Petri Serenius the Investment Director at Business Finland Venture Capital on the 29 th of 
March 2021 
539 Interview with Tito Cookey-Gam from Echo VC on the 18th of March 2021 
540 Interview with Dustyn Winder from Akili Ventures on the 17th of March 2021 
541 Interview with Dustyn Winder from Akili Ventures on the 17th of March 2021, Khaled Jilani from Afri-
cinvest on the 12th of March 2021 and Vasiliki Ntina from AVCA on the 16th of March 2021. 




considered as part of investment strategies. For Finnish VC firms, FinnFund is leading the 
way in this regard.543 
 
6.2.2 Being Geographically Far from Founders 
 
The term that kept popping up in interviews was “contact sport” when discussing VC refer-
ring to the fact that VC fund managers want to be in the proximity of the founders they are 
investing in. In QI 36% of interviewees mentioned being close to founders as a reason for 
having a geographic focus and 32% in QIII mentioned being geographically far from found-
ers as an obstacle to invest in Africa. Research seems to back this up partly: being part of an 
ecosystem and investing in it brings superior returns. However, these superior returns are 
not tied to the home of the VC firm and they can be replicated anywhere where similar 
activities are taken on. After the first investment in a new geographic area, the marginal 
monitoring costs of the market drop, and the success rate goes up.544  
 
On a most basic level, when there is a geographic difference there are two ways to close it: 
trips or having someone on the ground. Taking trips is a solution that FinnFund employs. 
Before an investment, FinnFund takes a week to travel out and meet the founding team and 
appraise the business.545 Opening an office in the target geography is another option to get a 
geographic footprint but hard to financially justify for a single fund unless the amount in-
vested in Africa would be a substantial portion of the portfolio.546 A hybrid solution would 
be to create an accelerator program547 though again, as with someone on the ground, the 
costs associated for a single firm are exorbitant thus requiring a unified effort from multiple 
backers.548 
 
The Covid-pandemic has demonstrated how VC activities can be accomplished virtually 
without physically meeting founders. All of the interviewed investors in the African market 
said they have managed to do deals during the pandemic without meeting the founders but 
 
543 Interview with Funmi Makinwa from CcHub Nigeria on the 26th of March 2021 
544 Chen et al. 2010 
545 Interview with Johanna Raehalme from FinnFund on the 23rd of March 2021 and Tito Cookey-Gam from 
Echo VC on the 18th of March 2021 
546 Interview with Tito Cookey-Gam from Echo VC on the 18th of March 2021 and Hans Osnabrugge from 
Brooklyn Ventures on the 11th of March 2021 
547 As an example, a six-week accelerator program in Africa once a year to find one to three investments. Ac-
celerators are often government-subsidized because of the high cost which is another obstacle since it would 
require the persuasion of a government entity in the target country or in Finland to fund a part of the pro-
gram. 




stressed the point that not being able to meet them has put emphasis on networks and local 
knowledge, the next obstacle that the thesis will cover. Having a good knowledge base and 
networks in the markets circumvents the need for meeting face-to-face.549 This is also sup-
ported by the fact that most US VC funds with investments in Africa have never set foot on 
the continent.550 Although, from a Finnish point of view this applied only to later stage com-
panies. Early stage companies need so much “hand-holding” that not even the abovemen-
tioned trips to the continent are enough. Series B companies onward were described as self-
sufficient enough to invest in without much contact.551 As VC backed start-ups are expected 
to scale quickly the later stage start-ups are ideally global in their actions and mindset in the 
same sense a Finnish or Nordic start-up would be so the challenges faced are similar; target-
ing the biggest markets and looking for rapid growth.552 This is also evident from the inter-
view data with Finnish VC firms; the earlier the stage focus was the more often being far 
from founders came up. Also, research into European VC firms’ that take an active owner-
ship approach backs the correlation of stage with the need for support.553 
 
Another angle in being geographically far from founders are the cultural differences. They 
impact especially the due diligence process of a VC firm. When investing in a culturally 
distant market VC firms are more thorough in their screening which adds to the costs and 
complexity of the deal.554 Some of the cultural differences are mitigated by the fact that start-
up entrepreneurs, especially in tech, are a quite homogenous bunch. Once the accents and 
other superficial differences are looked past, they all have the same goals, tools and ap-
proaches. Some US VC firms investing in Africa, possibly to bridge the cultural gap, have 
invested in start-ups with founders who have studied in the US.555 Research into the Kenyan 
founder profiles that have received funding supports this.556 The diaspora has been seen as a 
 
549 Interview with Khaled Jilani from Africinvest on the 12th of March 2021, Hans Osnabrugge from Brook-
lyn Ventures on the 11th of March 2021, Johanna Raehalme from FinnFund on the 23rd of March 2021 and 
Funmi Makinwa from CcHub Nigeria on the 26th of March 2021 
550 Interview with Khaled Jilani from Africinvest on the 12th of March 2021 and their modus operandi will be 
covered in more depth as part of the third obstacle. 
551 Interview with Johanna Raehalme from FinnFund on the 23rd of March 2021 
552 Interview with Khaled Jilani from Africinvest on the 12th of March 2021 
553 Botazzi et al. 2008 
554 See Nahata et al. 2014 
555 ibid 




major development driver on the continent557 and it was proposed that Finnish VC firms 
could seek out similarly start-ups with a hybrid background.558 
 
Post analysis the obstacle is valid but only in certain circumstances. Being geographically 
far from the founders causes major challenges for early ventures that require a lot of assis-
tance or funds that take a very active role along the whole lifecycle559. Another circumstance 
in which the obstacle applies is start-ups that plan to stay local which in most cases would 
anyway wane the interest of the VC firm in the first place because of the immense growth 
potential needed from the target start-ups to justify the investment.560 
 
6.2.3 Lack of Local Expertise & Networks 
 
The lack of local expertise and networks was the most prevalent obstacle when considering 
venturing to African. It also was the main reason why Finnish VC firms have a geographic 
focus. In QI, 44% of interviewees mentioned local expertise & networks as the reason for 
having a geographic focus and in QIII 64% voiced it as an obstacle to venturing. Research 
backs this up, networks and local expertise are vital for good return in VC561 and going 
abroad for a VC firm is an uphill battle because of the challenges associated with becoming 
familiar with a new market, monitoring it and building an advantageous network to get the 
most out of it.562 Simultaneously, economic decentralization widened the playfield and cre-
ated opportunities everywhere to disrupt and innovate so having a global network is growing 
in value.563  
 
When this obstacle was brought forth to the interviewees operating in the African VC scene, 
every single one gave the same solution for this obstacle: co-investing. Finding local partners 
was something that was already discussed in Chapter 3.3. but with more emphasis on sup-
portive services like legal advice and consulting. Co-investing has been a standard practice 
 
557 Plaza and Ratha 2011 
558 Interview with Khaled Jilani from Africinvest on the 12th of March 2021 and Johanna Raehalme from 
FinnFund on the 23rd of March 2021 
559 For example, a fund that invests in just a handful of firms and takes a very active role in evolving the busi-
ness. This might be typical in high-knowledge industries like life sciences where the founders are most often 
medical PhDs and need a partner in commercializing the innovation. 
560 Though Africa has some large internal markets the start-up will benefit from having a cross-border VC 
firm as part of the investment when taking the next steps into international markets. 
561 Hochberg et al. 2007 
562 Guler and Guillen 2010 




in VC for a long time in situations where the firms wish to share risk and information.564 
When venturing to emerging markets, as established through the blockers expressed by Finn-
ish VC firms, this sharing of risk and information is exactly what the firms need.565 Co-
investing alters the task of the VC firm entering the market. Instead of seeking start-ups for 
investment opportunities the Finnish firm would now pursue finding and creating a strong 
partnership with a local firm that is able to bring investment these opportunities filtered 
through their networks and knowledge.566 For the partnerships to work they need to be as 
frictionless as possible and built on a strong base of similar investment strategy and industry 
focus. These two areas align the goals of the VC firms when entering an investment. Overlap 
in experience, value adds567 and methods of operation align the ways of getting there.568 To 
figure out compatibility there is no big secret, just a transparent discussion. 
 
So how to find this partner for co-investment? There are a few ways to approach the search. 
VC firms in the African ecosystem recognize that all activity strengthens the ecosystem and 
in the long run everyone benefits so the general attitude towards partnerships is very positive. 
Every single interviewee mentioned being open to co-investments with firms coming outside 
the continent. The process of finding a co-investment partner is similar to the actions under-
taken by the writer of this thesis: doing research and reaching out. The first option when 
searching for a co-investment partner is to work back from deals. By simply finding deals 
on the continent that would have been interesting for the Finnish VC fund and then contact-
ing the local VC firms that participated in those deals is an easy way to find firms that might 
be aligned in the earlier mentioned vital areas.569 Another way is to contact hubs in the re-
gion. Hubs are very connected in their ecosystem and are glad to provide assistance for firms 
venturing into it.570 Finally, by simply doing research. In the same way, a new area of tech 
is researched, spending time familiarising with the African ecosystem will uncover actors in 
the market that could potentially be a co-investment partner. FinnFund’s approach is a com-
bination of all of the above in addition to being active and visible in regional events. To 
 
564 See Steier and Greenwood 1995 
565 Khavul and Deeds 2016 
566 Dai and Nahata 2015 
567 Relating to the ways the VC firms will support the start-up. 
568 Khavul and Deeds 2016 and interview with Eric Osiakwan from Chanzo Capital on the 18th of March 
2021 
569 Interview with Tito Cookey-Gam from Echo VC on the 18th of March 2021 




borrow a marketing term, staying top-of-mind is a vital part of FinnFunds strategy in Af-
rica.571 By being known in the ecosystem they get approached with deals that might other-
wise be unavailable because all the best deals are quickly oversubscribed.572  
 
There are a few ways for Finnish VC firms to structure these co-investing partnerships with 
VC firms in the African market. The first division is tied to the fact does the local VC firm 
also invest capital to become an equity partner in the start-up or not. There might be cases 
where the local VC firm has already invested all the capital of its fund or for a number of 
reasons is not willing or able to invest in the target start-up. In these cases, the co-investment 
is closer to the service relationship mentioned in Chapter 3.3. with the local VC firm han-
dling services like deal-making, paperwork, legal processes and sitting on the board among 
others in exchange for a 1 to 2% equity stake to ensure aligned interests. The local VC can 
also act as a fiduciary on the ground for a fee but this is less common.573 
 
In cases where the local VC invests alongside the foreign firm and becomes a sizable equity 
owner the partnership becomes a regular investment syndicate. Cross-border syndicates tar-
geting emerging markets have historically performed better574 than the local firm on its own 
investing domestically. The reasons behind this synergy benefit are myriad but the main one 
is sharing of knowledge575. The better performance of cross-border syndicates creates an 
incentive also for local firms to seek out foreign partners for their investments. Future returns 
of funds that have syndicated internationally also are positively affected as venturing with 
new partners provides new networks and experiences.576 In the African VC world, this has 
been recognized and most VC rounds are “party rounds”577.578 FinnFund has also taken the 
same approach and they always co-invest with at least one VC firm that has an office in 
Africa when carrying out VC type investments in the African market.579 
 
 
571 Interview with Johanna Raehalme from FinnFund on the 23rd of March 2021 
572 Interview with Khaled Jilani from Africinvest on the 12th of March 2021 
573 Interview with Eric Osiakwan from Chanzo Capital on the 18th of March 2021 
574 Though overlap is important there are bound to be learning opportunities and the partners become larger 
than their sum. 
575 Although it can be argued that the international firm is a high performer since it is venturing outside its 
home market and taking on international challenges which is proof of confidence from its investors and any 
investment where a firm like this is present would outperform an average domestic firm investing on its own. 
576 Khurshed et al. 2020 
577 Term for an investment round with multiple participants. 
578 Interview with Dustyn Winder from Akili Ventures on the 17th of March 2021 




The chapter with the most prevalent obstacle has the clearest solution. To overcome the 
challenge of not having local knowledge the VC firm should find a partner to co-invest with. 
The partner needs to align in at least strategy, value adds and industry focus for the partner-
ship to work and for there to be enough overlap in experience and methods of operation for 
the culture difference to not be so conspicuous it creates friction. These cross-border co-
investment partnerships are also proven in the early stages of the now burgeoning Israel’s 
start-up market580 and emerging economies of Asia581 so why not Africa? 
 
6.2.4 Corporate Governance & Unknown Risks 
 
The corporate governance & unknown risks obstacle connects into many of the areas covered 
in the chapters on the legal landscape of each chosen country. Finnish VC firms raised con-
cerns like minority shareholder protection, fraud, understanding their manoeuvre space and 
being able to trust the local law to be enforced. Unknown risks refer to the uncertainty relat-
ing to venturing to Africa “we do not know what we do not know” and good corporate gov-
ernance being the mechanism to lessen surprises. In QI only 8% of Finnish VC firms brought 
it up as a reason for a mandate but in QIII 40% raised it as an obstacle.  
 
This obstacle was something the interviewed investors in Africa likewise face when invest-
ing domestically.582 The interviews on the obstacle confirmed the research done on the legal 
landscapes of the three chosen countries. South Africa has a relatively strong corporate gov-
ernance system that can be relied on as an investor stemming from its strong stock market. 
Kenya falls second needing additional measures taken by VC investors to minimize risks 
and even with Nigeria recently enacting the Code of Corporate Governance it remains the 
most challenging ecosystem from a corporate governance standpoint as the effects are still 
slowly permeating through the start-up ecosystem.583 
 
There might be differences in legal landscapes but the solutions given by the interviewees 
to minimize risks relating to the target start-ups are applicable across the continent; their 
importance is just more undeniable in certain jurisdictions. Unlike in Finland, where start-
 
580 Khavul and Deeds 2016 
581 See Dai et al. 2012 
582 Even though interestingly all three African countries covered in the thesis rank better in minority protec-
tion than Finland in the GII. 
583 Darambola 2012 and Memba et al. 2012 and interviews with Khaled Jilani from Africinvest on the 12th of 




ups have a certain formality to their structure from the very beginning, an investment by a 
VC firm prompts the establishment of corporate governance for a start-up in Africa in most 
cases. The readiness of the firm for corporate governance needs to be determined through 
in-depth due diligence during which the local network is also of great importance giving 
their experience-based opinion.584 The requirements for corporate governance are then set 
out in the term sheet creating barriers and demands.585 FinnFund has an almost standardized 
framework of compliance they need their investments to execute on and with a clear check-
list of what the firms need to accomplish before anything is signed and also what needs to 
be done post-signing.586  
 
Another way of looking at the lack of corporate governance in pre-VC start-ups is that the 
investing VC firms have the opportunity to build corporate governance into a form that they 
prefer. This sets up the relationship to be more symbiotic when the governance is built 
through negotiation rather than the VC plugging in.587 Corporate governance does not have 
to be built in an African jurisdiction588.589 Most foreign VC investors demand the start-ups 
to be incorporated in jurisdictions they understand and are more tax optimal than the domes-
tic jurisdiction of the start-up almost becoming standard practice for African start-ups that 
receive foreign VC investments. American VC firms prefer Delaware and the Cayman Is-
lands590 for incorporation and European firms Mauritius.591 Jurisdictions where the VC firms 
are used to operating ease the investment process, lower investment-related risks, create a 
better base for additional funding or exits and enable the VC fund to lower its tax burden.592  
 
Once the place of incorporation has been decided there are a few mechanisms to insert into 
the term sheet to de-risk the investment by addressing the concerns listed at the beginning 
of the chapter. The objective is to stem blind spots and be well aware of what is happening 
 
584 Interview with Vasiliki Ntina from AVCA on the 16th of March 2021 and Johanna Raehalme from 
FinnFund on the 23rd of March 2021 
585 Interview with Tito Cookey-Gam from Echo VC on the 18th of March 2021 
586 Interview with Johanna Raehalme from FinnFund on the 23rd of March 2021 
587 Interview with Eric Osiakwan from Chanzo Capital on the 18th of March 2021 
588 Similarly to the mandate obstacle, it seems that for African start-ups a path to international capital is in-
corporating outside the continent. 
589 Ndemo and Weiss 2017 
590 Interview with Dustyn Winder from Akili Ventures on the 17th of March 2021 and Khaled Jilani from Af-
ricinvest on the 12th of March 2021 and Funmi Makinwa from CcHub Nigeria on the 26th of March 2021 
591 Interview with Johanna Raehalme from FinnFund on the 23rd of March 2021 




in the business.593 Thresholds for capital burn, placing a new C-level executive in, independ-
ent board members that are non-executive or alternatively observer seats and regular state-
ments on the progress of the business are methods utilized by African investors.594  
 
Setting thresholds is similar to milestone financing595 which has been utilized in VC for a 
long time to break down the investment into tranches that are contingent on the firm reaching 
certain milestones to receive the next chunk of financing.596 The difference in thresholding 
is the capital release method. The investor sets a certain cash burn rate that is not tied to any 
milestones but is instead tied to passage of time; an x amount of dollars is authorized for the 
following 3-month period and any additional capital needs board approval. By thresholding, 
the investor understands what is happening in the firm and capital exposure is constantly at 
a low level.597  
 
Placing a new C-level executive into a start-up is also a practice employed outside the con-
tinent. Bringing in a new high-level executive with the VC investment helps the start-up 
transition towards the next stage of its growth cycle with a fresh perspective.598 In addition 
to these benefits, a new C-level executive “infiltrates” the inner working of the day-to-day 
business and hiding any questionable activity in a start-up from someone in such a key role 
is very difficult.599 Having independent board members that are non-executive or observer 
seats on the board accomplish the same goal on a bit higher level keeping the strategic deci-
sions making in check and aligned with the VC firms’ targets.600  
 
 
593 Interview with Dustyn Winder from Akili Ventures on the 17th of March 2021 
594 Interview with Tito Cookey-Gam from Echo VC on the 18th of March 2021 and Eric Osiakwan from 
Chanzo Capital on the 18th of March 2021 
595 Utilized often in cases where the venture is a long-shot or the venture capitalist’s role is central to success. 
Long shot ventures are for example biopharma drug development where the VC firm might release more and 
more capital as the firm manages to prove the viability of the drug in development through research. If the 
drug fails, there is no need for capital anyway, so milestone financing is an optimal way for the VC firm to 
incentivise progress. When the venture capitalist’s knowledge or network is vital to the success of the venture 
releasing all the capital to the entrepreneur is not in the best interest of the VC firm since it will anyway be 
the driving force behind the venture.  
596 Cuny and Talmor 2005 
597 Interview with Tito Cookey-Gam from Echo VC on the 18th of March 2021 
598 See Gerasymenko et al. 2015 
599 ibid 
600 Interview with Eric Osiakwan from Chanzo Capital on the 18th of March 2021 and Funmi Makinwa from 




Additionally, to the ex-ante methods of minimizing risks ex-post the VC firm can utilize 
well planned recurring reporting to follow key financial and non-financial metrics.601 The 
IFC Toolkit for Disclosure and Transparency is something that is utilized on the continent 
when building reporting of the start-up.602  
 
Another point of view that was brought up during the interviews is not the risk between the 
investor and start-up but between the start-up and the market. Informal processes, as the 
thesis has demonstrated, are an element in the start-ups business dealings and these open the 
firm and its owners to risks.603 Firms need to navigate the environment recognizing where 
challenges arise and how to tackle them without opening the firm to liability and breaking 
the law but remaining competitive. This is a fine art604, dubbed in the interview as “AI”605 
that requires someone on the ground606.607 
 
A Finnish VC firm overcome this obstacle with good due diligence, placing a new executive 
into the start-up, thresholding, independent board members or observing board seats and 
well-structured reporting. On the flip side all these actions taken to minimize risks are time 
and resource consuming and additional to the traditional role of a VC investor. Recognizing 
this helps the VC firm price these costs into the investment and examine risk minimization 
options already during the due diligence process. Also, the firm needs to reflect is it able to 
put in the effort required to reach a risk level it is comfortable with. However, the solution 
to the previous obstacle in a way is intertwined with the solution to corporate governance 
and unknown risks; the co-investment partner is able to take on these challenges with the 





601 See Wang et al. 2017 
602 Interview with Funmi Makinwa from CcHub Nigeria on the 26th of March 2021 
603 See Saka-Helmhout et al. 2020 and Goel et al. 2020 
604 The example given was dealing with business situations where bribes might be asked for and if not pro-
vided, might cause issues for the business. The entrepreneur in collaboration with the investors needs to fig-
ure out a way to circumvent this situation because besides the ethical issues there is no place on the balance 
sheet for bribes. 
605 African Intelligence 
606 Relating back to the previous blocker and having a co-investment partner who understands the challenges. 







The objective of the thesis was to establish the main blockers for Finnish VC firms when 
weighing the option of investing in Africa and then provide solutions to overcome them 
whilst acting as a roadmap for a Finnish firm looking to venture into one of the three chosen 
jurisdictions. The chosen jurisdictions reflect the different environments across the conti-
nent. To oversimplify the country profiles: Nigeria has a somewhat turbulent ecosystem pro-
ducing a lot of innovation, South Africa has a stable ecosystem with good structures but 
stagnating economically and Kenya is the country with a rapidly developing ecosystem and 
a bright future. By investing in any of these countries, VC firms have a chance to make an 
impact like nowhere else; every investment is an impact investment.608  
 
The most prevalent obstacles in the way of venturing to Africa expressed by the firms were 
mandates, being geographically far from founders, lack of local expertise & networks and 
corporate governance & unknown risks. As each obstacle was delved into, solutions emerged 
but so did barriers that were found insurmountable. These insurmountable “sub-obstacles” 
characterize the profile of a fund that would be able to venture to Africa from Finland. The 
fund needs to optimally tick four boxes: 1. Cannot be focused on early stage start-ups. 2. 
Needs to find a local co-investor. 3. Cannot have a mandate blocking Africa as an investment 
option. 4. Is a specialized fund.  
 
Out of the obstacles that morphed into a four-point checklist the first three are more irremis-
sible than the last one. Early stage start-ups need too much assistance to be invested in with-
out close contact, without a co-investor the learning curve and cost associated with gaining 
a foothold in the market would be too high and a mandate blocking investment in Africa is 
also incontestable. The fourth point, specialization of a fund, is not mandatory but the con-
sensus in research seems to point to the fact that venturing outside your domestic geography 
as a generalist does not add value for the investors but for those pioneering specialized funds 
that are ready to join the first wave of top international VC firms in Africa ample opportu-
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Appendix A: Fund structure of Icebreaker Fund I 
 
Source: Icebreaker.vc sijoittajastruktuuri (https://www.icebreaker.vc/about)  
 
Appendix B: Data from questions to Finnish VC firms to discover obstacles 
 
Q1: “Why do you have a geographic focus on investments?” (”Miksi teillä on maantieteel-
linen rajaus sijoituksissa?”) 
 
Obstacle Amount As % of total As % of people answering 
Founded with Finnish market in mind 3 7 % 12 % 
Mandate 10 24 % 40 % 
Being geographically close to founders 9 22 % 36 % 
Networks 6 15 % 24 % 
Local expertise 5 12 % 20 % 
Corporate Governance 2 5 % 8 % 
Lack of Resources 5 12 % 20 % 
Fear of intense competition 1 2 % 4 % 







Q3: “Why did you answer Yes/No to the previous question?” (”Miksi vastasitte kyllä/ei 
edelliseen kysymykseen?”) with the previous question being:” “Have you ever thought of 
investing in Africa?” (”Oletteko koskaan harkinneet Afrikkaan sijoittamista?”) 
 
Obstacle Amount % of Total As % of people answering 
Founded with Finnish market in mind 3 6 % 12 % 
Mandate 5 9 % 20 % 
Being geographically close to founders 8 15 % 32 % 
Local expertise 10 19 % 40 % 
Lack of Resources 5 9 % 20 % 
Lack of Dealflow 4 8 % 16 % 
Corporate Governance 6 11 % 24 % 
Network 6 11 % 24 % 
Unknown Risks 4 8 % 16 % 
Taxation 1 2 % 4 % 
Lack of Confidence 1 2 % 4 % 
Total 53   
 
 
Appendix C: People Interviewed 
 
The following table lists all the people interviewed for the thesis that did not wish to re-
main anonymous.  
Name Position Firm 
Dustyn Winder Founder and Managing Partner Akili Ventures 
Ebubechukwu Nnachi Intern CcHub Nigeria 
Eric Osiakwan Managing Partner Chanzo Capital 
Funmi Makinwa Compliance Manager CcHub Nigeria 
Hans Osnabrugge  Partner Brooklyn Ventures 
Johanna Raehalme Investment Manager FinnFund 
Khaled Jilani  Senior Partner Africinvest 
Petri Serenius Investment Director Business Finland VC 
Tito Cokey-Gam Senior Analyst Echo VC 
Vasiliki Ntina Research Associate AVCA 
 
 
